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The Predictive Interactive Multiple Memory Systems (PIMMS) framework has been used 
to explain how novelty, or more precisely “prediction error”, boosts memory encoding. 
In this thesis, I explored several other phenomena in the animal and human literature that 
PIMMS cannot yet explain but should. 
PIMMS predicts that unexpected information will be better encoded than expected 
information. However recent work has suggested that expected information can also be 
better remembered than less expected information. By using a range of expectancies for 
the location of objects with an immersive virtual reality (iVR) kitchen, I showed that 
memory is a “U-shaped” function of expectancy, with best memory for highly expected 
or highly unexpected locations relative to intermediate levels of expectancy. Using OSF-
registered Bayesian inference, this U-shape was consistent across four experiments. 
While the advantage for highly unexpected locations is consistent with PIMMS, the 
advantage for highly expected locations is not. Importantly, the advantage for expected 
locations was not simply due to a guessing bias when the location was forgotten, 
suggesting that the advantage arises during encoding rather than just at retrieval.  
This U-shape is consistent with another framework - the SLIMM framework - which 
proposes that different brain regions support the two ends of the U-shape, such that the 
advantage for unexpected information should be associated with recollection of 
contextual information via a medial temporal lobe system (like in PIMMS), while the 
advantage for expected information should be associated with a feeling of familiarity 
based on rapid cortical consolidation enabled by a medial prefrontal cortex system. 
However, when I asked participants to indicate recollection or familiarity at retrieval, 
both ends of the U-shape continuum were associated with higher recollection, while there 
was no detectable effect of expectancy on familiarity. I consider why this SLIMM 
prediction may therefore be incorrect. 
Another finding in the literature concerns the effect of novelty on unrelated information 
shortly preceding or succeeding the novel experience. PIMMS says nothing about this 
penumbra effect, which has been related to plasticity-related proteins triggered by the 
novel experience (so-called “behavioural tagging”). Since participants report that their 
first iVR experience is highly novel, I submitted a Registered Report to test whether iVR 
affected memory for unrelated words that were encountered prior to entering the iVR 
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room. In short, the finding was that there is no evidence that novelty improves memory 
performance for information learned before experiencing something novel. Possible 
reasons for the failure of finding an effect were discussed.  
A final limitation of PIMMS I considered was the effect of “boundaries” in continuous 
stimuli, which are known to affect memory for the temporal order of information. While 
boundaries might be generated by prediction errors, PIMMS is silent on how they affect 
temporal order memory. Using a movie featuring a series of rooms, I tested whether 
memory for the temporal order of objects encountered in those rooms is affected by 
doorways between rooms and/or by surprising/perceptual changes within a room. 
Unfortunately, I was unable to replicate a previous report where temporal order memory 
was worse for pairs of objects in different rooms (i.e., either side of a doorway) than 
objects in the same room, let alone either sides of a surprising/perceptual change within 
a room. 
Taken together, my findings and the literature demonstrate the multiple potential factors 
that determine how novelty affects memory encoding (and consolidation), which require 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Events that are new, different or unusual often “stick in our minds”. For example, imagine 
you live and work in an urban area and you take the same route to work in your car every 
morning. One day you see a flock of sheep blocking the road on your commute. You will 
probably remember this event for a long time, while the other countless times you have 
driven down that road will be inaccessible. Numerous studies have confirmed this 
observation, namely that if we experience a novel event in a familiar context, we tend to 
store and remember this event more easily. However, if you happen to live in the 
countryside close to a sheep farm, your experience might be quite different: because you 
see sheep quite frequently, you might experience just another regular commute to work 
that is hardly memorable. Thus, the experience of novelty is not ‘absolute’ and cannot be 
defined independent of the observer; rather it is driven by what an individual expects to 
experience compared to what they actually encounter. This comparison between 
expectation and experience parallels the computation of a prediction error (PE) in many 
other theories of learning. According to such theories, we continuously generate 
expectations about our environment and update those predictions when they are wrong, 
i.e., when a PE occurs. While the role of PE in learning is well established in experiments 
on certain types of memory (e.g., in conditioning and associative learning; Rescorla & 
Wagner, 1972), its role in conscious and verbalisable memory (i.e. declarative memory; 
see below for explanation) is less so. The theoretical framework that is central to this 
thesis, which helps to shed some light on the complex relationship between novelty, PE 
and memory (encoding), is the ‘Predictive Interactive Multiple Memory Signals’ 
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(PIMMS) proposal of Henson & Gagnepain (2010). While this powerful framework helps 
us to understand – among other things – how novelty relates to declarative memory, it 
also has several limitations. The topic of my thesis thus is to highlight and examine 
empirically some of those shortcomings. First, I will briefly recap major theories of 
memory, in order to relate them to the scope of this thesis.  
1.1 (Very) Brief Review of Human Memory 
Human memory is widely believed to not be a unitary construct, but rather contains 
numerous distinctions. One of the most notable distinctions is between short-term 
memory (STM), which stores information temporarily for a matter of seconds, and long-
term memory (LTM), which is generally believed to be able to store some information 
indefinitely. This distinction goes back to at least Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) and is still 
upheld today, even though some disagree (see Norris, 2017, for a review on this question). 
In my thesis, I focus on LTM, but there are potential interactions with STM (or “working 
memory”, WM) in the final empirical chapter on event segmentation.  
Another important distinction is between declarative memory (i.e., conscious, 
verbalisable memory) and non-declarative memory (e.g., procedural memory; Squire, 
2004). Central to this thesis, the former type has been subdivided into semantic memory 
(“general knowledge of the world”) and episodic memory (“remembering personally 
experienced past”; Tulving, 1995, p. 841), while others have proposed an additional 
“perceptual memory” system that underlies non-declarative phenomena such as 
perceptual priming (Schacter & Tulving, 1994).  In his seminal SPI model, Tulving 
(1995) explains encoding, storage and retrieval in perceptual, semantic and episodic 
memory systems as serial, parallel and independent (hence the name SPI): information 
is encoded serially, by passing from perceptual through semantic to episodic memory 
systems, which leaves multiple potential memory traces in each system in parallel, any of 
which can be retrieved independently (depending on the task). The PIMMS framework 
questioned this model however, accepting that experiences can leave memory traces in 
multiple levels throughout the brain, but claiming that interactions between these levels 
are important for both encoding and retrieval (an “interactive-parallel-interactive” model 
of encoding-storage-retrieval). These interactions take the specific form of (top-down) 
predictions and (bottom-up) PE across a hierarchical organisation of these levels (see 
later). Moreover, those levels are defined by the type of representations they process 
(rather than a specific memory function), which might be perceptual features (e.g. colours 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
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and shapes), items (e.g., everyday objects defined by their perceptual features) and 
context (e.g., spatiotemporal environment in which objects are encountered). While there 
are no doubt many more such levels in reality, these three allow definition of episodic 
memory (that can lead to recollection) - as new associations between contexts and items 
- and semantic memory (that can lead to familiarity) - as (temporary changes) in existing 
associations between items and their features (Figure 1.1). PIMMS tentatively maps these 
three levels onto different brain regions, though these are only indirectly relevant to the 
present thesis.  
 
Figure 1.1: Schematic illustration of the PIMMS framework: Illustrated here is the 
PIMMS model that shows how different types of content (features, objects and 
contexts) are represented layers that roughly map onto SPI’s memory systems 
(perceptual, semantic and episodic). Dashed and solid lines represent feedback 
predictions and feedforward PE. Retrieval from the perceptual, semantic and 
episodic memory manifest in priming, familiarity and recollection respectively. The 
latter two are both contributing to recognition memory. Furthermore, on the left 
shown are brain regions that are postulated to mainly contributed to the respective 
layers. PRC = perirhinal cortex, ATL = anterior temporal lobe and OTC = occipital-
temporal cortex.  
Chapter 2 deals with PIMMS’s (in)ability to explain how well new associations between 
items and their (spatial) context are encoded as a function of the degree of PE. 
For Chapter 3, it is necessary to further introduce the process of consolidation, in addition 
to encoding and retrieval. Consolidation refers to the time period between encoding and 
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retrieval, during which a memory is not necessarily passively stored in some latent state, 
but is actively transformed from a temporary to a more permanent state, which may 
involve specialised brain mechanisms, e.g., during sleep. Indeed, consolidation likely 
involves multiple processes at different spatial and temporal scales (gene expression, 
synaptic remodelling, etc.), and an important distinction has been made between 
cellular/synaptic consolidation and system consolidation. The former describes 
physiological processes that change synaptic strengths by inducing structural changes in 
cells, which in principle might occur throughout the brain. This type of consolidation is 
less contentious than system consolidation (Dudai, 2004; Frankland & Bontempi, 2005), 
which refers to the time-dependent role of specific brain regions in memory, such as the 
medial temporal lobe (MTL) in episodic memory. The standard theory of system 
consolidation posits that new memory traces are initially dependent on the hippocampus 
until they are gradually transferred to the neocortex; a process that might take years to 
occur (Frankland & Bontempi, 2005). Note however that other theories, such as “multiple 
trace theory” (Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997), argue that detailed memories always depend 
on the hippocampus and each time a memory is encoded, another memory trace is created, 
explaining why memories can get stronger and more resistant to forgetting. A related 
theory is the “context binding theory” (Yonelinas et al., 2019), which argues the 
hippocampus binds item-related and context-related information, that retrieval of detailed 
item-context information is always hippocampus-dependent and that forgetting is simply 
the result of contextual interference. In any case, the majority of consolidation theories 
posit that there is a time window during which memories can be modulated after their 
initial encoding, such as the occurrence of a very novel/salient event. This is tested in 
Chapter 3, since PIMMS is largely silent on consolidation, and so needs elaboration. 
Finally, most memory experiments use discrete stimuli, whereas real experience is 
continuous. It has been suggested that memories are formed by segmenting that 
experience. PE is believed to play a crucial role as has been suggested in various empirical 
and computational work (e.g. Reynolds et al., 2007). While PIMMS formalises PE, it has 
not yet been extended to continuous stimuli, but treats an event as a stationary snapshot 
without any temporal dimension. Moreover, event segmentation affects memory in 
various ways, such as memory for temporal order, that are not specified by PIMMS.  This 
is tested in the final empirical  part (Chapter 4), where I attempted to replicate a study by 
Horner et al. (2016) that showed that moving through doors in a virtual environment 
affects memory for the order of objects encountered in those rooms.  
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1.2 Novelty/surprise and memory encoding in PIMMS  
Coming back to PIMMS, higher levels in a perceptual-mnemonic hierarchy are constantly 
predicting the activity in lower levels and the difference between the predicted and actual 
activity (at a single moment in time) – the PE – is fed back from lower to higher levels. 
For a given layer, the predictions from the level above serve as a prior probability 
distribution (in a Bayesian sense), whereas the activity profile (produced from the level 
below) is equivalent to the evidence or likelihood, while the PE is the divergence between 
these two distributions (the summed area of no overlap; see Figure 1.2)1. According to 
PIMMS, the size of the PE then determines how well a new event is encoded into 
memory. This PE acts “locally”, in the sense that it strengthens just the association 
between just the active (winning) representations in each connected  level (similar to the 
“delta” learning rule in Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), such as between a specific context 
and an (unexpected) object encountered in that context. 
One of the earliest reported examples of novelty/surprise in memory is the von Restorff 
effect (or isolation effect). In one of her seminal experiments, von Restorff (1933; for a 
translation see Hunt, 1995) presented four pairs of syllables along with one pair of 
symbols, numbers, letters or patches of colour. The atypical pairs were better recalled 
immediately afterwards.  While this seems consistent with PIMMS’s hypothesis that PE 
drives better memory encoding, the isolation effect can also arise for items early in the 
series, at a point where the typical list composition is not apparent, so no clear predictions 
should be possible (e.g. see von Restorff, 1933). Therefore, von Restorff herself actually 
dismissed encoding as the process underlying the memory benefit. Similarly, others 
argued that von Restorff’s effect can be explained with distinctiveness at retrieval 




1 More precisely, the PE that drives learning is the divergence between the prior and the posterior, on the 
assumption that the initial PE between the prior and the likelihood is what drives perception (activity 
changes), which seeks to minimise this PE over a few hundred milliseconds (producing the posterior 
distribution), leaving the residual PE that drives synaptic change instead (Henson & Gagnepain, 2010). For 
simplicity though, I assume here that the posterior is close to the likelihood, such that the qualitative 
implications are the same.  
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recall of physically distinct words was clustered, which might suggest that these items are 
stored together aiding their retrieval. Others posit there is a direct link between 
distinctiveness and the retrieval context which is to say that it provides an advantage in 
retrieving items from that specific context (McDaniel et al., 1995).  
In contrast, Geraci & Manzano (2010) argued that stimulus salience develops over the 
course of an episode that is the whole presentation of a list, which allows early list items 
to benefit from surprise. Furthermore, more recent work (Schmidt & Schmidt, 2017) has 
also demonstrated that unexpected events benefit from processes that operate not only 
during retrieval but also during encoding, depending on the context and task demands. 
So, while some aspects of the von Restorff effect might be due to non-PE related retrieval 
mechanisms, PE, which leads better encoding, undoubtably plays some role in this 
phenomenon. 
A related finding, which has been coined the classic ‘novelty effect’ in episodic memory, 
was popularised by Tulving and Kroll (1995), though first examined by Kinsbourne and 
George (1974). In this paradigm, participants are familiarised with a list of random words. 
In a second “critical” phase, they see a list of new words, intermixed with some of the 
familiarised words. Finally, they are presented with a third list of words, and asked to 
recognise any that came from the second, critical phase. A common finding in this 
paradigm is that the new words are better recognised than the familiar words, despite the 
fact that they were presented fewer times in total2. This led to the formulation of the 
novelty-encoding hypothesis, which postulates that novel information is preferentially 
encoded by brain regions like the hippocampus (Tulving et al., 1996), which supports 
episodic memory.  
However, the cause of this ‘classic’ novelty effect has been challenged by alternative 
explanations, other than a special role for novelty in encoding, such as distinctiveness or 
source confusion at retrieval (Åberg & Nilsson, 2001; Dobbins et al., 1998; Greene, 1999; 




2 Note, it is critical that participants are asked to recognise items specifically from the critical phase; if 
participants are instructed to recognise items studied in either list, memory is better for items that were 
repeatedly presented (Kafkas & Montaldi, 2015a; Kim et al., 2012). 
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an impairment for familiar stimuli owing to contextual interference, e.g., “Did I see this 
stimulus in the familiarisation phase (first list) or study phase (second list)?”, rather than 
benefit for the non-familiarised (novel) stimuli, which produces increased false alarm 
rates and hence overall decreased old/new discrimination. However, other studies 
controlled for confounds like interference, and reinforced Tulving and Kroll’s (1995) 
conclusion that there is a benefit for this type of words. Åberg and Nilsson (2003), for 
instance, reported a novelty effect for high confidence responses that showed both 
increases in hit rates and decreases in false alarm rates for novel items, which suggests 
the effect cannot be explained fully by reduced retrieval accuracy for familiar items, but 
rather enhanced encoding of novel items. Similarly, Kormi-Nouri et al. (2005) presented 
distinct encoding tasks to minimize source confusion at retrieval, and still observed better 
memory for novel over familiar words, consistent with the general idea of the novelty-
encoding hypothesis.   
PIMMS’s perspective on this “classic” novelty effect is somewhat different. Its 
explanation of this effect relates to predictions made by the temporal context: When you 
encounter the list of random words in the familiarisation phase, you are unable to predict 
the next word. However, in the critical phase, you notice that some of the words are 
repeated from the familiarisation phase, so you might start to expect further repetitions. 
Indeed, if novel items become less expected, they will elicit a greater PE than the familiar 
words, and therefore become more strongly associated with the context of the critical 
study phase. Therefore, when finally asked to recognise words specifically from that 
phase, you are better able to do so. If this interpretation is correct, then the advantage of 
these “novel” words should depend on the strength of expectation for repeated words, 
which could be tested by manipulating the ratio of familiarised to new words in the critical 
phase. This prediction is consistent with Kafkas and Montaldi (2015), who showed that 
the novelty effect reverses when the previously presented words are rare, i.e., it is the 
unexpectedness rather than relative familiarity that determines memory. 
To understand further how PIMMS explains the relationship of novelty, surprise and 
memory, let us consider a level representing the current items perceived (e.g., objects), 
which may or may not be predicted from a higher level representing the context (e.g., 
environment). Take the example of sheep encountered in the urban environment: the 
context is predicting a typical urban configuration meaning seeing houses, road-signs, 
other cars, etc., whereas the sensory input is indicating the presence of sheep. This 
corresponds to an expectation that predicts only certain types of objects but the data 
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indicates the presence of an unexpected object (Figure 1.2). This results in high PE, which 
causes strong encoding of the event. I refer to such situations as “surprise”, in keeping 
with other related work (Reichardt et al., 2020). In fact, this surprise could occur at 
multiple levels of the processing hierarchy. When it occurs between contextual 
predictions about familiar items, I call it “context surprise”. However, our knowledge of 
familiar items (e.g., sheep) allows us to make predictions about the perceptual features 
(e.g., four legs, white wool, etc.) that comprise those items. When one or more features 
differ from those expected (e.g., a pink sheep), then PE occurs at this lower level of the 
hierarchy. I call this “item surprise” (Figure 1.2B). Both types of surprise are similar to 
Berlyne’s (1960) concept of relative novelty. This type of surprise (and not novelty per 
se) is what drives memory encoding and leads to strong memory, however as I will show 
later that surprise (i.e. unexpectedness) is not the only way through which events can be 
encoded well into memory.  
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Figure 1.2: Schematic illustration of expectation and data over items and the 
likelihood of each individual item in the PIMMS framework: Items are assumed to 
be clear and unambiguous therefore the data is one if the items is present in the 
scene and zero if not. The bars reflect activity in a layer of neurons, where the 
discrete items or features on the x-axes are sorted arbitrarily by category labels - 
zoomed in merely for illustration. The x-axes only represent a tiny portion of large 
space of items or features so that right to the farm animals could for instance be 
sport equipment. The yellow bars represent the prior expectation from the “higher” 
level, whereas the blue bars indicate whether the item is known and is present in the 
scene, input from the level below (ultimately the sensory input). The data takes the 
value of one if present unless the semantic systems lacks representation as is the case 
for item novelty. The PE, which drives learning, is the difference between 
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expectation and data, whose magnitude is illustrated at the bottom right of each 
panel by a blue bar next to the main graphics. Panel A: precise expectation for items 
in a certain context, where one item is completely unexpected (context surprise). 
Panel B: the same as Panel A, except it refers to features of an object in lower 
perceptual level (item surprise). Panel C: Flat expectations and precise data (context 
novelty). Panel D: precise expectations and flat data (item novelty). Panel E: precise 
expectations and precise data with the for the same items (leading to no PE or 
learning; no surprise or novelty). Panel F: flat expectations and flat data, a 
combination of context novelty and item novelty (or “complete novelty”), but one 
predicted to show no PE or learning. 
If you on the other hand consider a situation where you encounter an item you have never 
seen before, then the data is flat instead – i.e., you do not know how to interpret the 
sensory evidence. I call this “item novelty”. This would correspond to the urban 
commuter encountering the sheep, but in this case, having no prior knowledge of animals 
like sheep at all. 
In principle, where the expectation and the data overlap closely (Figure 1.2E), so that PE 
is low, there is no need to do any learning (i.e., no need to waste resources re-encoding 
what is already known). Interestingly, as I will show later, there are however situations 
where something is reasonably expected, yet it is still encoded well into memory. A low 
PE can also emerge from a flat expectations and flat data, as can be seen in Figure 1.2F. 
Importantly, this special case of “complete (or maximal) novelty” (e.g., encountering 
unknown objects in an unknown environment) is actually predicted to produce negligible, 
rather than “maximal”, learning. In contrast to surprise, novelty in the sense discussed 
above is not associated with a memory benefit, which is at odds – at least on the 
terminological level – with several prominent models and accounts of novelty and 
memory (e.g. Lisman & Grace, 2005).  
The key function of the contextual level is to optimise the predictability of an item 
occurring in a particular spatiotemporal context, i.e., store context-item associations. 
When we encounter a familiar item in a context that is different from what is expected, 
the ensuing PE induces learning of more accurate associations between episodic and 
semantic representations. This is the type of learning that enables memory of the 
spatiotemporal context in which an item occurred, or what has been called “recollection” 
(Mandler, 1980; Montaldi & Mayes, 2010; Yonelinas, 2002). This contextual level is 
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associated with the hippocampus and other brain structures in the MTL and beyond 
(Aggleton & Brown, 1999; Mayes et al., 2007; Moscovitch, 1995; Moscovitch et al., 
2016; Scoville & Milner, 1957; Squire, 1992).  
Note that PEs can, and normally do, arise automatically, based on prior knowledge 
triggered by perceptual inputs, i.e., predictions are rarely intentional (Foster & Keane, 
2015, 2019 for a different view). However, whereas Morris (2006) claimed that attended 
experiences are automatically recorded by the hippocampus, but normally fade and 
become lost, I claim that PE modulates the degree of encoding and therefore determines 
whether an experience will be available as a lasting memory. However, both views are 
not incompatible. As shown in Chapter 2, expected information per definition means low 
PE, yet there is ample evidence that schema-related information is encoded well, not 
despite of, but because of this information being expected. This may be possible because 
after automatic recording (Morris, 2006), prior knowledge helps to integrate expected 
information (see below for more discussion).  
The semantic level on the other hand stores information about familiar items, and predicts 
which features are expected on the basis of a given item being present. There is a 
bidirectional flow of information between all levels, so not only do currently active item 
representations make predictions about associated perceptual features, but currently 
active features also influence which item representations remain active (i.e., perception 
involves dynamic competition across all systems in order to minimise overall PE). The 
semantic level is associated with anterior temporal lobe regions, including perirhinal 
cortex, and it is the strengthening of item-feature associations that enables the feeling of 
“familiarity” (rather than recollection), which sometimes accompanies recognition 
memory (Mandler, 1980; Montaldi & Mayes, 2010; Yonelinas, 2002), though some found 
that the hippocampus is also important for familiarity (Song et al., 2011).  
Finally, while there are probably numerous levels of intermediate perceptual 
representations (as noted above), for example depending on the modality, for visual 
stimuli of the type used in this thesis, PIMMS associates posterior temporo-occipital 
regions associated with representing perceptual features, repeated processing of which 
can result in memory phenomena such as priming (Henson et al., 2003).  
While the above section has illustrated how PIMMS can be applied to the literature of 
novelty and surprise and their role in declarative memory (for more extended discussion, 
see Quent, Henson & Greve, 2021), the aim of this thesis is to highlight and examine a 
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number of shortcomings of PIMMS. The first shortcoming I address is that, while PIMMS 
explains how unexpected information is retained well, paradoxically the same seems to 
be true when information is highly expected, i.e., conforms to our prior knowledge or 
schema (e.g. Tse et al., 2007, 2011), addressed in the next section.  
1.3 Expected as well as unexpected information is remembered 
well 
Key to everyday functioning is the ability to predict aspects of our environment, and one 
source of such predictions are “schemas” (Bartlett, 1932). Schemas influence how we 
respond to and encode new experiences into memory (Bransford & Johnson, 1972), which 
in turn has the potential to update or form new schemas in the future to allow better 
predictions. Fernandez and Morris (2018) defined schemas as frameworks of knowledge 
(i.e. facts, skills but also attitudes) that are represented in a network of neurons that are 
connected and store memory traces. When these memory traces are activated, they alter 
responses to new information and therefore affect encoding, consolidation and retrieval. 
Clewett et al. (2019) simply views schemas as an “extracted rule based on knowledge”. 
Others highlight in addition that schemas help us to generalise beyond experiences (e.g. 
Cockcroft et al., 2021). For the current purpose, schemas are active abstracted knowledge 
about recurring situations, such as what to expect when walking into a kitchen (compared 
to a bathroom, or other type of room), which affects cognition in general and memory in 
particular.  
Numerous studies have shown that memory is better for information that fits with our 
prior knowledge, i.e., is expected from a schema (Alba & Hasher, 1983; J. R. Anderson, 
1981; Craik & Tulving, 1975). This so-called “congruency effect” has been obtained 
using a broad range of memoranda (e.g. Bein et al., 2015; Brod & Shing, 2019; van 
Buuren et al., 2014). At the same time, many other studies show the apparent opposite 
finding, of better memory for unexpected or surprising information, i.e. that is 
incongruent with a schema (e.g. Brod et al., 2018; Greve et al., 2017; von Restorff, 1933; 
Worthen & Hunt, 2006), as is predicted by PIMMS.  
This raises the question how information that is congruent or incongruent with a schema 
can both be remembered well. The neuroscientific model SLIMM (schema-linked 
interactions between medial prefrontal and medial temporal lobe; van Kesteren et al., 
2012) proposes that memory is a U-shaped function of schema-congruency, i.e., the 
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degree of expectancy of encountering a specific event, given a schema. More specifically, 
it is hypothesized that different brain systems support memory for the two ends of the U-
shape: one based in the MTL and one based in neocortex, for which the medial prefrontal 
cortex (mPFC) plays a key gate-keeper role.  
The MTL system (including the hippocampus) is assumed to encode highly unexpected 
(schema-incongruent) events, i.e., ones in which a schema’s predictions are violated, 
producing PE. This system is therefore consistent with the PIMMS framework, though 
one subtle difference is that, whereas in PIMMS, PE drives local learning between the 
predictor and predicted, PE in SLIMM is assumed to trigger encoding of an episodic 
snapshot that captures all information present, regardless of whether it is relevant to the 
schema, i.e., including incidental contextual information (“global PE”). The evolutionary 
rationale for this is that, if something happens that is not predicted by the current schema, 
one wants to capture other contextual information that might be relevant to explaining 
why the schema failed, which (if it recurs) could be used to update (or create a new) 
schema in future. For example, if one is surprised to find boiling water coming from a tap 
on a kitchen sink, one should remember details about that tap, and update one’s kitchen 
schema so that, when encountering such taps again, one knows that making tea can be 
done using boiling water from these taps (rather than from a kettle). 
The other neocortical system involves the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), which best 
encodes highly expected (schema-congruent) events. SLIMM assumes that, when high 
“resonance” occurs between a schema and the perceived environment, the mPFC inhibits 
the MTL system (preventing an episodic snapshot) and instead augments direct encoding 
of the event into neocortex (even if that encoding is transient). Importantly, only 
information that is relevant to the schema is encoded, such as the location of a kettle used 
to make tea in a new kitchen that one enters (given that making beverages is one function 
of a kitchen), whereas incidental information, such as the colour of the kettle, is lost. 
Evidence for these two systems comes from Tse and colleagues (Tse et al., 2007, 2011). 
These authors showed that schemas allowed animals that were trained to remember 
flavour-location pairings to quickly assimilate new information, which then became 
independent from the hippocampus faster than would be expected by the standard systems 
consolidation view. Importantly, this type of fast learning was accompanied by up-
regulation of immediate early genes in mPFC and pharmacological intervention targeting 
mPFC abolished fast acquisition and retrieval of flour-location pairings. This suggests 
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that the long route of system consolidation (from hippocampus to neocortex) can be 
bypassed via the mPFC if a schema exists. 
In humans, Greve et al. (2019) provided the first behavioural evidence for the U-shape 
predicted by SLIMM. The authors used a paradigm in which the schema was an abstract 
rule about the relative value of two types of objects, and episodic memory was tested for 
trials containing unique numbers of each object type. More specifically, these authors 
tested episodic memory under three levels of expectancy/congruency: a congruent 
condition in which a trial was as predicted by a rule, an “unrelated” condition where there 
was no rule (or only a weak rule), and an incongruent condition in which a trial broke a 
strong rule. Across four experiments, memory for unique trials was worse in the unrelated 
(middle) condition than in the two others, i.e., there was a U-shaped function across the 
three conditions. Furthermore, memory for the two extreme conditions (congruent and 
incongruent) appeared dissociable by other variables, as is predicted by SLIMM if they 
are supported by different memory systems with different characteristics. For example, 
memory for incidental information was only improved in the unrelated condition, as 
predicted by SLIMM when a PE triggers encoding of an episodic snapshot. 
Nonetheless, there are several limitations to the Greve et al. (2019) study. Firstly, with 
only three levels of schema-congruence, it is possible that memory was worse in one 
condition than the other two (particularly the middle one) because of differences between 
conditions other than expectancy (such as level of task engagement when there is no clear 
rule, which the authors tried to address by various manipulations, but these may not have 
been sufficient). A more elegant approach would be to manipulate expectancy in a 
continuous fashion (i.e., parametrically rather than categorically). Secondly, the 
“schema”, while an abstract rule, was arguably a trivial case of the much richer schemas 
that operate in everyday life. Thirdly, that schema had to be learned across several 
“training” trials, which made the experiment long, and may also have produced different 
levels of schema strength across participants (even if on average their behaviour showed 
good learning of the rule). Furthermore, while possibly adding a level of experimental 
control, any paradigm in which schemas are learned during the experiment would be 
difficult to apply to patients (such as those with MTL lesions), who may not be able to 
learn a new schema in the first place (i.e., any decrement in their memory for trials relative 
to controls could reflect poor schema learning rather than impaired episodic encoding). 
Many of these problems can be overcome by using pre-experimental schema, e.g., 
everyday schema that are learned over many years prior to participating in a laboratory 
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experiment (or prior to a brain lesion). Therefore, I developed a paradigm that uses pre-
experimental knowledge about kitchens (and what one expects to encounter in them).  
The details are described in Chapter 2, but in brief, the aim was to replicate a U-shaped 
function of memory for new information as a more continuous function of schema-
congruence (or what I will call “expectancy”), using a much more realistic, pre-
experimental schema. To this end, I used immersive virtual reality (iVR) to “place” 
participants in a life-like situation (a virtual kitchen), and tested their memory for the 
locations of objects to examine it as a function of how likely those objects were to appear 
in that location (i.e., based on their pre-existing schema for typical locations to find 
objects in a kitchen). So for example, a kettle might appear on the kitchen counter 
(expected), on a kitchen table (neither strongly expected nor unexpected) or on top of a 
trashcan (unexpected). I then tested participants’ memory using recall, where they had to 
place a given object at the location where they remembered it, and recognition, where 
they had to select which of the three images of an object in different locations 
corresponded to the location they remembered (i.e., three-alternative forced choice, 
3AFC). 
One possible explanation for the U-shape is that unexpected locations are surprising, 
attract attention and this improves memory encoding. Expected locations, however, are 
not necessarily encoded better, but simply benefit at retrieval owing to the tendency for 
participants to guess an expected location (based on their schema) when they cannot 
remember the specific location. To control for the latter guessing effect, I ensured that the 
two foils used in the 3AFC test showed locations for the target object that were 
approximately equally expected (based on normative ratings). If the U-shape remains in 
3AFC performance, then this suggests that the memory advantage for expected locations 
also occurs at encoding, supporting the idea of two separate memory systems. 
A second prediction of the SLIMM model follows from its assumption that the two 
memory systems operate according to different mechanisms, evolved for different goals. 
As noted above, it makes sense for the MTL system that underlies the memory advantage 
for surprising events (those that produce a high PE) to encode an episodic “snapshot” of 
such events, which includes surrounding contextual information that appears incidental 
to the prediction (schema). This is different to PIMMS, which assumes only associations 
relevant to the schema will be strengthened by PE, not incidental details. On the other 
hand, the mPFC system underlying memory for expected information is assumed to 
enable rapid integration of new information into an existing schema, during which 
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incidental (contextual) information is lost, because it is not part of that schema (van 
Kesteren et al., 2012). SLIMM therefore predicts that memory for expected information 
will be associated with a feeling of familiarity instead, in the absence of recollection of 
the original context. I therefore used a variant of the “remember/know” procedure 
(Tulving, 1985) to assess whether memory for unexpected locations was more likely to 
be associated with “remember” responses while memory for expected locations was more 
likely to be associated with “familiar” responses. 
In summary, Chapter 2 is centred on the question that PIMMS cannot predict this U-
shape, while SLIMM can. A second limitation of PIMMS addressed in this thesis relates 
to the fact that it is silent on neurobiology, and therefore cannot explain some phenomena 
related to PE and memory that appear to relate to the processes of cellular/synaptic 
consolidation.  
1.4 PIMMS is silent on neurobiology 
In Chapter 3, I turn to the question how experiencing something novel influences our 
memory for information that occurs in close temporal proximity to that experience? As 
noted above, it is well established in both human and non-human animals that novel 
stimuli that are surprising are remembered better than familiar stimuli (e.g., Ranganath & 
Rainer, 2003; Tulving & Kroll, 1995; van Kesteren et al., 2012). A neurobiological 
explanation for this is the increased neuromodulatory influences of acetylcholinergic and 
noradrenergic systems (Ranganath & Rainer, 2003) and/or of dopaminergic regions in the 
midbrain (Bunzeck & Düzel, 2006; Lisman et al., 2011; Lisman & Grace, 2005). 
According to one framework for example (Lisman et al., 2011; Lisman & Grace, 2005), 
novelty is detected in the hippocampus, which sends a signal to the ventral tegmental 
area, leading to release of dopamine in the hippocampus via dopaminergic back 
projections, which in turn lowers the threshold for learning (Schomaker, 2019). While 
novelty and surprise are not necessarily identical (Quent et al., 2021), these 
neurobiological explanations are not part of PIMMS.  
Interestingly, experiencing something novel can not only enhance memory for the novel 
information itself, but also affect memory for other, unrelated information that occurs in 
temporal proximity to the novel information (Fernández & Morris, 2018). This 
enhancement of memory for information occurring either before or after the novel 
experience has been shown in both non-humans (Ballarini et al., 2009; Moncada & Viola, 
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2007) and humans (Ballarini et al., 2013; Fenker et al., 2008; Ramirez Butavand et al., 
2020). Novelty-related memory enhancement has been found in a variety of paradigms: 
inhibitory avoidance (Moncada & Viola, 2007), spatial memory (Wang et al., 2010), 
spatial object recognition (Ballarini et al., 2009), contextual fear conditioning (Ballarini 
et al., 2009) conditioned taste aversion (Ballarini et al., 2009), story and picture recall 
(Ballarini et al., 2013) and word learning (Fenker et al., 2008; Schomaker et al., 2014). 
In possibly the most real-world application of this novelty effect in humans, Ballarini et 
al. (2013) showed that memory of primary school children was enhanced if they attended 
special science or music lessons that were designed to be novel. The enhancing effect was 
observed for the learning of other, unrelated verbal and pictorial information, provided 
the novel lesson took place within an hour before or after learning, consistent with a 
critical time window during which the novelty effect operates (see below).  
One neurobiological explanation for the effect of novelty on surrounding information is 
provided by “behavioural tagging theory” (BTT; Ballarini et al., 2009; Moncada & Viola, 
2007), which itself derives from the physiological mechanisms proposed by the synaptic 
“tag-and-capture” theory (Frey & Morris, 1997; Redondo & Morris, 2011). Briefly put, 
this theory postulates that two main steps are important to maintain late-long-term 
potentiation (late-LTP). First, a synapse is tagged because it has received input. In the 
second step, the tagged synapse needs to capture so-called plasticity-related products 
(PRP) in order to induce the lasting structural changes that give rise to late-LTP. 
Experimentally it can be shown that strong tetanisation of a synaptic input can produce 
both tagging and subsequent PRP capture. Weak tetanisation of a synaptic input, on the 
other hand, induces early-LTP, but this is not maintained unless the second stage of PRP 
capture occurs. One way to produce this PRP capture is to provide a second, strong 
tetanisation to a different synaptic input on the same population of neurons. In that case, 
both synaptic inputs benefit from the provision of PRPs and hence late-LTP is maintained. 
Something similar to strong tetanisation can potentially come from a different, but highly 
novel input, leading to a similar maintenance of late-LTP (Li et al., 2003; Straube, Korz, 
& Frey, 2003; Straube, Korz, Balschun, et al., 2003). Both the induction of LTP in the 
hippocampus and behavioural tagging are dopamine dependent (Li et al., 2003; Wang et 
al., 2010), consistent with the aforementioned idea that dopamine is crucial for novelty-
related memory enhancement (Lisman et al., 2011; Lisman & Grace, 2005).  
Within the “tag-and-capture” theory, the lifetime of a tag is limited to approximately 90 
minutes (Redondo & Morris, 2011), requiring the weakly-learned information and strong 
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tetanisation to co-occur within that time window. Likewise, behavioural tagging only 
occurs within a certain time window (Ballarini et al., 2009; Moncada & Viola, 2007). For 
instance, weak inhibitory avoidance training that normally only leads to spatial  STM can 
be strengthened to LTM if animals are allowed to explore a novel, open field within up 
to an hour of that training (Moncada & Viola, 2007). However, the timescale of the 
behavioural tagging window depends on the task characteristics and may even have a 
nonlinear expression, given that some animal studies have shown that novelty that is too 
close to the unrelated encoding event does not enhance memory (Moncada et al., 2015). 
Information about the temporal dependencies in humans is scarce however, and several 
studies have shown memory enhancement when a novel experience occurs within a few 
seconds of the learning experience (e.g. Bunzeck & Düzel, 2006; Schomaker et al., 2014). 
In addition to the time between the encoding of critical information and the novel 
experience, a second consideration is the time between the novel experience and the 
subsequent test of memory (retention interval). Most animal models assume that a period 
of consolidation is required, such that the effects of novelty only emerge after a delay. 
However, in humans, Bunzeck and Düzel (2006) showed that presenting familiar images 
at the same time as novel images led to an overall increase in memory performance for 
the familiar images in a subsequent recognition memory task, but only when recognition 
was tested immediately; not when tested the next day (see also Biel & Bunzeck, 2019, for 
a failure to find an effect of novelty the next day). The effect of retention interval and 
possible role of consolidation therefore remains unclear.  
According to BTT, there are at least two further boundary conditions for behavioural 
tagging. Firstly, as noted above, novelty does not enhance memories traces that are 
already strong, presumably because they already sufficiently captured PRPs (Moncada & 
Viola, 2007). This may explain why the effect of novel lessons on children in the above 
Ballarini et al. (2013) study was most pronounced for difficult information, which 
presumably would have only led to weak memories otherwise. It is also consistent with 
recent findings related to stress. Like novelty-related memory enhancement, stress-related 
memory enhancement have been linked to processes akin to those hypothesized in tag-
and-capture theory (Bergado et al., 2011; McIntyre et al., 2012; Richter-Levin & Akirav, 
2003). For example, spatial recognition memory in rats was promoted from STM to LTM 
by acute stress after weak but not after strong training (Lopes da Cunha et al., 2019), and 
stress-related increases of cortisol in humans only predicted memory for weakly-learned 
neutral words, but not for strongly-learned reward-predicting words (Quent, McCullough, 
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Sazma, Wolf, & Yonelinas, 2018; see Dunsmoor, Murty, Davachi, & Phelps, 2015, for 
similar effects using Pavlovian fear conditioning).  
However, the suggestion that novelty preferentially aids weak memories is less easy to 
reconcile with other human studies. For example, Fenker et al. (2008) used a paradigm 
similar to Bunzeck and Düzel (2006) to demonstrate that presenting novel images 
enhanced memory for unrelated words, but they only found this enhancement for words 
whose recognition was accompanied by a “Remember” judgment; the advantage was not 
seen for words whose recognition was accompanied by a “Know” judgment. Remember 
and Know judgments are associated with the theoretical concepts of recollection and 
familiarity, and while these concepts are not synonymous with memory strength 
(Yonelinas, 2002), few would contest that items judged familiar have, on average, weaker 
memory representations than those recollected. It is possible then that some words in 
Fenker et al.’s study were initially encoded weakly, but the novel experience boosted 
them sufficiently that they were later recollected. However, it also seems likely that some 
words could have be encoded so weakly that they would not be recognised at all (i.e., 
missed), had a novel experience not boosted them such that they at least seemed familiar. 
In this case, an effect of novelty would be expected on Know judgments as well as 
Remember judgments, and possibly more so, if Know judgments are a better indicator of 
items that were initially encoded weakly. 
One possible explanation for Fenker et al.’s finding that novelty improved recollection 
relates to a second boundary condition of BTT: that information must converge on the 
same neural population that is activated by the novel experience, in order for that 
information to benefit from the novelty-induced PRPs (Ballarini et al., 2009; Nomoto et 
al., 2016). For instance, open field exploration does not enhance conditioned taste 
aversion in rats, but a novel taste does (Ballarini et al., 2009). Here it is important to 
distinguish conceptually-unrelated (e.g. word learning and spatial navigation) and 
neuronally-unrelated. In its most basic form, BTT postulates that detection of novelty 
leads to a dopaminergic signal that boosts encoding in places that receive that signal. It is 
therefore conceivable that novelty is detected by one neural population within a brain 
region (e.g., the hippocampus), but a wide-spread signal is also received by other 
populations within that region, including the population that is encoding task-relevant 
information. Therefore, information that is conceptually-unrelated to the novel 
experience can still benefit providing the information is neuronally-related in the sense 
of receiving the same memory-boosting signal. Given the above evidence that 
Novelty, Prediction Error and Memory Encoding: Limitations of the PIMMS framework 
20  Jörn Alexander Quent - November 2021 
hippocampus is important for detecting novelty, and other evidence that the hippocampus 
is important for encoding the spatiotemporal and associative context that defines 
recollected memories, then it is possible that a novel experience only improves 
recollection of information (as in Fenker et al., 2008).  
A further consideration is the nature of the novel experience. Previous human studies 
have used novel images or films, and at least one of these (Biel & Bunzeck, 2019) recently 
failed to find an effect of novelty. This study compared the effects of watching novel 
versus familiar films, and the authors speculated that the lack of difference was because 
the films did not engender active engagement, at least to the level engendered by the 
exploration of a novel spatial environment that is used in many animal studies. 
Furthermore, if the hippocampus is key for the novelty effect, active navigation might be 
important for maximally engaging the hippocampus, given its role in navigation (Burgess 
et al., 2002; O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978). One way to expose humans to a novel environment, 
but within the controlled setting of a laboratory, is to use VR. Indeed, another human 
study used VR to compare novel versus familiar environments in their effects on words 
learned immediately after the experience (Schomaker et al., 2014). Exploring a novel 
environment, relative to a familiar one, enhanced free recall of the words, though not 
recognition memory for the words (though these authors did not distinguish recollection 
versus familiarity in their recognition task). Since recall requires recollection, these 
findings are consistent with Fenker et al. (2008), on the assumption that their recognition 
performance was dominated by familiarity.  
Given the importance of these findings for education and other real-world situations, in 
Chapter 3 I attempted to replicate the effects of a novel spatial navigation experience on 
memory for unrelated words, presented immediately prior to the novel VR experience, as 
a function of the encoding task (deep vs. shallow) and retrieval quality (recognition with 
remember vs. know judgments, plus recall), to test whether weakly learned information 
and recollection would be most affected by the novel experience.  
1.5 PIMMS fails to explain the effects of event boundaries  
A final limitation of PIMMS I consider is the effect of  “event boundaries”. While PIMMS 
describes dynamic interactions between representational layers, it treats the information 
that is encoded as discrete experiences, without any consideration of how we segment our 
continuous experience into such discrete chunks or “events”. Indeed, it has been proposed 
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that PEs, of the type considered by PIMMS, are the way that we segment experience, by 
creating “event boundaries” whenever something happens next that we do not predict, 
based on our current schema (Zacks et al., 2007). These boundaries may then be points 
in time at which we “bind” the information in STM/WM from the preceding event, in 
order to create a LTM trace (Ben-Yakov & Henson, 2018). 
While PEs are one possible trigger for event boundaries, according to the event 
segmentation theory (EST; Reynolds et al., 2007; Zacks et al., 2007), a recent review by 
Clewett and colleagues (2019) suggests that general shifts in space, goal or perception 
also lead to event boundaries. Moreover, these authors reviewed evidence that 
experiencing a boundary can impair memory for the temporal order of information, as 
well as increased estimates of temporal distances and overestimation of temporal 
durations. For example, many studies using simple sequences of pictures on different 
backgrounds report superior memory for the order of two pictures when they occur within 
same event (background) compared to when they straddle an event boundary (different 
backgrounds) (DuBrow & Davachi, 2013, 2016; Ezzyat & Davachi, 2014; Heusser et al., 
2018). At the same time, item recognition and item-context binding can be enhanced by 
boundaries (Heusser et al., 2018; Rouhani et al., 2020; Swallow et al., 2009). 
A more typical, everyday experience of event boundaries occurs when passing through 
doorways between rooms. For example, when you get up from the couch in the living 
room to go to the kitchen, you sometimes forget what you wanted to do as soon as you 
walk through the door. This effect is called the location updating or doorway effect, and 
has been extensively studied (Lawrence & Peterson, 2016; McFadyen et al., 2021; 
Pettijohn & Radvansky, 2018a, 2018b; Radvansky et al., 2010, 2011; Radvansky & 
Copeland, 2006; Seel et al., 2019). For example, Radvansky (2006) asked participants to 
navigate through a series of rooms that contained objects on top of tables. Participants 
picked up an object from one table and carried it to the next one, where they put the object 
down and picked up another one. Periodically, memory was probed for the objects that 
were either just put down or picked up, and memory was typically lower if the participants 
had just walked through a doorway. To account for the location updating effect, the EST 
has been further developed to the Event Horizon Model (EHM; see Radvansky et al., 
2011). This model posits that: 1) events are created by boundaries for which event models 
are generated, but people can only process one event model at a time; 2) the current event 
model foregrounds information pertaining to that model; 3) retrieval is facilitated for non-
competitive retrieval but impaired for competitive retrieval and 4) causal relations among 
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events are stored. The third property explains why walking through a door impairs item 
memory: walking through a door creates a new event model, but the most recent object  
is associated with the previous room (event model), and so memory is impaired as both 
event models compete for retrieval (though see Logie & Donaldson, 2021, for alternative 
accounts, as discussed further in Chapter 5). Horner et al (2016) found that doors between 
rooms (in virtual reality) also affect memory for the temporal order of objects encountered 
within versus between those rooms. 
However, it remains unclear what aspect of walking through a doorway renders it a 
boundary. It could be that there is something special about doors, but it could also be that 
context shifts that result from going from the living room to the kitchen are responsible. 
However even if the encoding context was reinstated (by returning to the room), the 
location updating effect can still be observed (Radvansky et al., 2011). On the other hand, 
walking through a door also typically leads to perceptual change (PC). For instance, you 
probably have different kinds of objects and furniture in the kitchen than you have in the 
living room, as a consequence you experience PC when you walk through that door. The 
obvious way to tease these apart is to have a PC in the absence of a door, and/or a door 
in the absence of a PC. Or perhaps neither PC or a door matter, and what really matters 
is a PE. Other possible reasons that I did not plan to examine with this paradigm but are 
potentially relevant are context and schema shifts. These were my general aims in Chapter 
4, i.e. to try to tease apart the effects of doors, PC and PE on the formation of event 
boundaries, as measured by their effects on memory for temporal order that objects were 
encountered within versus across rooms in a virtual environment, similar to Horner et al. 
(2016); though in the end, I could not replicate a basic effect on temporal order memory 
in my version of this paradigm, as discussed later in Chapter 4.  
1.6 A note on the statistics used in this thesis 
Before moving to the empirical parts of this thesis, it is important to consider the statistical 
approach I took. There is a recent and growing interest in using Bayesian inference, rather 
than the more typical frequentist approach (e.g., p-values), for scientific claims (Dienes, 
2016; Morey et al., 2016; Wagenmakers et al., 2011). One reason is to be able to quantify 
evidence against an effect, which can be expressed through the Bayes Factor (BF) for one 
hypothesis (e.g., the alternate hypothesis H1) relative to another (e.g., the null hypothesis 
H0): 
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In frequentist statistics, one cannot easily quantify evidence against H0, but rather only 
report the probability (p-value) of H0 producing the data (i.e., a statistic as high or higher), 
and so if this is not small enough (e.g. p > .05), one is left with absence of evidence rather 
than evidence of absence. 
Another reason for a Bayesian approach is to facilitate more efficient experimental 
designs, called “sequential designs” (Schönbrodt & Wagenmakers, 2018), where data can 
stop being collected as soon as a BF (either in favour of the null or in favour of the 
alternative) surpasses some criterion (see table below). This is more problematic for 
frequentist approaches (Dienes, 2016). I used sequential designs in Chapters 2 and 4. 
While the scientific field has settled on a conventional frequentist p-value (alpha) of .05 
for declaring something as “significant”, less consensus has been reached about what BF 
constitutes “strong evidence” for example. While some Bayesians would prefer not to 
categorise BFs with verbal labels, it is helpful to assign some verbal labels to ranges of 
BFs (Jeffreys, 1998; Kass & Raftery, 1995). For this thesis, I have adopted what is 
currently regarded as “publishable” evidence by various journals in our field, which 
typically either accept BF10 > 6 and BF10 < 1/6, or BF10 > 10 and BF10 < 1/10. I therefore 
adapted the  previous conventions (Jeffreys, 1998; Kass & Raftery, 1995) as shown in 
Table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.1: Convention how to label evidence in terms of BF. 
BF10 EVIDENCE 
> 100 Extreme evidence for H1 
30 – 100 Very strong evidence for H1 
10 – 30 Strong evidence for H1 
6 – 10 Moderate evidence for H1 
3 – 6 Anecdotal evidence for H1 
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3 – 1/3 Inconclusive evidence 
1/3 – 1/6 Anecdotal evidence for H0 
1/6 – 1/10 Moderate evidence for H0 
1/10 – 1/30 Strong evidence for H0 
1/30 – 1/100 Very strong evidence for H0 
< 1/100 Extreme evidence for H0 
 
Finally, there is always debate about the appropriate priors to use for Bayesian inference, 
since the evidence (BF) depends on the priors for each parameter in the statistical model. 
This is an advantage of pre-registering analyses, which protect one from being accused 
of altering one’s priors post hoc (after seeing the data), and most of the analyses in this 
thesis were (pre-)registered on the Open Science Framework (OSF, https://osf.io; with 
the exception of some of the initial, pilot experiments in Chapters 2 and 4, and when 
problems with original analyses, or useful additional analyses, became apparent between 
one experiment and the next, as in Chapter 2). Here I used standard recommendations for 
those priors, which depend on the type of statistical model used (e.g., T-tests, ANOVAs 
or logistic regression). These are “objective” priors that enable estimation of the 
probability that the data came from H0, versus probability that the data did not come from 
H0 (i.e., H1 = ~H0, rather than “subjective” priors for H1, namely that the data came from 
a different distribution with a specific effect size). For some of my experiments, I also 
simulated the Bayesian equivalent of “power”, i.e., the probability of obtaining a BF 
above a certain threshold as a function of the sample size and the effect size (by generating 
random data with an effect size of 0 for H0, or, say, a Cohen’s d of 0.5 for H1).  
1.7 Summary 
To sum up, I have outlined three prominent areas that are related to PE, novelty and 
memory, but which cannot currently be explained by PIMMS. First, PIMMS cannot 
explain why highly expected information is encoded well (Chapter 2); second, PIMMS  
cannot explain why memory for information surrounding a novel experience is often also 
remembered well (Chapter 3); and thirdly, PIMMS cannot explain how continuous 
stimuli are segmented by event boundaries and how those boundaries affect memory 
(Chapter 4). In brief, Chapter 2 confirmed a U-shaped function of memory against 
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expectancy, for which the advantage for expected events is not predicted by PIMMS, but 
is consistent with the related SLIMM model, while Chapters 3 and 4 found no evidence 
for (and sometimes evidence against) an effect of novelty on preceding information or an 
effect of doorways on temporal order memory, respectively. Chapter 5 discusses all these 
findings, in particular the extent to which the results in Chapters 3 and 4 reflect limitations 
of the paradigms used, versus remain fundamental problems for PIMMS. 
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2 THE EXPECTED CASE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As explained in Chapter 1, PIMMS is unable to explain how expected information is 
remembered well because its lack of PE. So to show both expected (schema-congruent) 
as well as unexpected (schema-incongruent) information is encoded well, I used iVR to 
test people’s memory for the location of everyday objects within a virtual kitchen. The 
expectancy of each object-location was derived from normative ratings of 20 objects in 
each of 20 possible locations, from which pairings were selected to cover a range from 
highly expected (+100) to highly unexpected (-100; see below for more information). 
Participants spent only 45 seconds exploring the virtual kitchen and were instructed to 
count these 20 objects, before the objects were removed for a short delay, and participants 
were asked to place individual objects at their remembered location, followed by the final 
3AFC test outside iVR (using stills on a computer screen).  
This paradigm was inspired by a study (Lew & Howe, 2017) that used realistic photos of 
schema-evoking rooms (bathroom, kitchen, living room and office) to investigate how 
expectedness of locations for specific objects affected memory for those objects and for 
their locations. The photos showed room-congruent objects at expected and unexpected 
locations, as well as room-incongruent objects. At test, objects either stayed in same 
location or shifted to a different location. Recognition memory for objects was better for 
room-incongruent objects as well as room-congruent objects at unexpected locations, 
relative to room-congruent objects at expected locations. However, when memory was 
tested instead by recall of an object’s location, memory for objects at unexpected 
locations was impaired relative to room-congruent objects at expected locations. The 
authors explained their findings in terms of schemas acting differently on item and 
associative (location) memory, whereby an unexpected location attracts attention, but also 
activates schema-congruent bindings that interfere with memory (see also Bower et al., 
1979). 
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However, another possible explanation for Lew and Howe’s finding of impaired recall of 
the location of objects at unexpected locations is that, if participants forgot the location, 
then they guessed based on a schema. For example, if you forget where you saw the 
saucepan, then you can use prior knowledge to guess that it was on the stove. A similar 
guessing bias has been used to explain the advantage of schema-congruent information 
in source memory (Bayen et al., 2000; Kleider et al., 2008; though also see van der Linden 
et al., 2017). This guessing bias could have obscured any advantage in memory for the 
location of objects at unexpected locations. One way to address this bias (as used here) is 
to test memory with forced-choice tests, in which the target (saucepan on stove) and foil 
(saucepan in cupboard) are matched on their expectancy. Furthermore, Lew and Howe 
only had two levels of expectancy, so could not test for a U-shaped function of memory 
that the SLIMM model predicts (see Chapter 1). I therefore used a continuous 
(parametric) range of expectancies, based on the participants’ ratings. 
My two main predictions were: 1) recall and recognition for object-location would be a 
U-shaped function of expectancy of an object’s location, as tested by a quadratic 
component and interrupted linear regression, and 2) recollection, as estimated from 
remember/familiar judgments, would decline with expectancy, while familiarity would 
increase with expectancy. To allow for individual differences in schema, expectancy 
ratings were defined individually, based on a debriefing phase. 
I tested these two hypotheses across four experiments. The first experiment was an initial 
attempt to obtain a basic U-shape, while the next three iterations added a measure of 
recollection/familiarity to additionally test the second hypothesis. Apart from the first 
experiment, the experiments were preregistered, and I used Bayesian analysis to 
propagate evidence across experiments, i.e., using the posterior of one experiment as the 
prior for the next experiment. First, a small normative study was run to determine at which 
pre-defined locations to place the objects, in order to allow sampling from the whole range 
of expectancy (from very unexpected to very expected). 
2.2 Normative study 
In order to select where to place each object, and to get a range of expectancy values, six 
participants were shown screenshots of each object at each location and asked to rate how 
expected that object was in that location. They were then asked to also rate the general 
expectancy of each object in a kitchen. 
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Methods 
Participants 
Participants were members of the research group (five females and one male; age M = 
36.83 (SD = 2.14)).  
Materials 
 
Figure 2.1: All object locations in the kitchen: Pre-defined object locations are 
shown with microwave as the example object. 
The virtual kitchen was 5.15 by 4.40 virtual-metre (vm) kitchen, where 1 vm corresponds 
to approximately 1 metre in the real-world (material available at https://osf.io/4sw2t/ and 
https://github.com/JAQuent/schemaVR). 20 objects were placed at 20 locations within 
the kitchen, and then a still image captured of each object in each location (see Figure 
2.1). The objects (Table 2.1) consisted of 12 kitchen objects and 8 non-kitchen objects, 
inspired by Lew & Howe (2017). Within the kitchen, 20 places were defined as canonical 
object locations where all objects could be placed. Due to the different sizes, which 
ranged from a large microwave to a small kitchen knife, not every place in the kitchen 
was suitable to become an object location. While some of the pre-defined locations where 
selected with certain objects in mind (e.g. the stove top was chosen with the sauce pan in 
mind) to include very expected locations, some were chosen for the opposite reason (i.e. 
being very unexpected locations like in the corner of the floor). Generally, object 
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locations were spaced out, however – as in a normal kitchen – certain areas like the 
working surfaces of the kitchen contained a higher density of object locations.  
   
Table 2.1: List of kitchen objects and non-kitchen objects used: Table shows the 






likely each of 
the 20 objects 
was to be 
found in each 
of the 20 
locations (i.e., 
400 trials in 
total) from -
100 to +100 using a slider. Four additional objects (kitchen: peppers and a white pot; non-
kitchen: a dumbbell and wrench) were used to create eight object/location practice trials, 
which were shown first to give participants an idea about the task and calibrate their 
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Figure 2.2: Mean normative rating of object-location for each object at each 
location: Individual ratings could vary from -100 to 100. The column titled ‘overall’ 
(right) shows average general expectancy rating for each object. 
 
These ratings were then ranked from 1 and 400 within each participant (since different 
participants used different ranges of values), and the ranks were averaged over 
participants. Then an algorithm was run with close to 10 million iterations in which each 
object was randomly assigned to the 20 locations along with two foil locations that were 
randomly chosen (the foil locations were used in the 3AFC test of memory, and should 
have expectancies close to that of the target location). When the solution was not valid 
(e.g. the same location used for foil 1 and foil 2), this step was repeated until a valid 
solution was returned. For each valid solution, the sum of squared differences between 
the ranks of the targets and the intended uniform spread (“SS of targets”) and the sum of 
squared differences between the ranks of the targets and both foils (“SS of foils”) were 
calculated. In a two-step process, the number of solutions was first reduced to only 
include the 0.0001th percentile of the “SS of foils” distribution, to prioritize adequate foils 
that are similar in expectancy to the target. Second, the remaining solutions were sorted 
by their “SS of targets” values and then checked for problems (e.g. some object not being 
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visible). The first valid set of 20 object-location pairs that was found by this algorithm is 
shown in the Appendix (see Table 7.2). 
2.3 Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 used the optimised set of 20 object-location pairs from the normative 
experiment to test for a basic U-shape for object-location memory as a function of 
expectancy of that location, and estimate its effect size. This was defined by the quadratic 




All participants in the study were Cambridge community members from the volunteer 
panel of the MRC Cognition and Brain Science Unit or recruited through word-to-mouth 
from the wider Cambridge community, all of whom had reported normal or corrected-to-
normal visual acuity, provided informed consent and received monetary compensation 
for participation, as approved by a local ethics committee (CPREC 2020.018).  
Because Experiment 1 was the first experiment on this paradigm, no effect size was 
available to power the study, and so I decided to test 16 participants, as a number typical 
of laboratory memory experiments. These participants had a mean age of 26.38 (SD= 
3.52), with eight females and eight males. For one participant, information about whether 
the objects were seen or not at study was lost. However, recordings of their object 
placement was intact, so I kept this participant, given that it was rare for objects to be 
reported as not seen.  
Materials 
The first set of 20 object-location pairings that were optimised from the normative study 
(Set 1) were used. 
Procedure  
The basic paradigm for all four experiments is illustrated in Figure 2.3, and contains an 
encoding and recall phase performed in iVR, followed by a recognition and expectancy-
rating phase performed on a computer screen. During encoding, participants were asked 
to navigate freely through a virtual kitchen for 45 sec, with the instruction to count and 
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memorise the locations of all 20 objects that were scattered across the room. A small 
amount of exploration (i.e., movement and rotation) was required to detect all 20 objects. 
Following encoding and prior to recall, participants entered a blank environment for 
approximately 2.5 min to practice how to place objects (simple cubes) using the iVR hand 
controls; a skill that was needed in the subsequent recall phase. For recall, participants 
then re-entered the kitchen (now without the objects being present), were given one object 
and asked to place it at its previously seen location (once placed, the object disappeared, 
and the process was repeated for the remaining 19 objects). Participants were encouraged 
to guess if they were unsure, but could skip if they did not remember the object at all (a 
miss). Recall accuracy was defined as whether or not the correct location was the closest 
of the 20 object locations to the recalled location. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Schematic overview of paradigm: This paradigm differed across the 
three experiments only in object-location pairings and precise memory tests. I) 
Encoding (in iVR): participants explored a virtual kitchen (45 sec) and were 
instructed to count and memorise 20 object locations. II) Recall (in iVR): all 20 
objects were removed, and participants were given one object at a time to be placed 
where previously encoded. III) 3AFC (outside iVR): each of the 20 objects was 
presented on a computer screen but in three alternative locations (where the two foil 
locations were approximately equally expected as the correct location). Experiments 
2 and 3 collected additional remember/familiar judgments. IV) Individual 
expectancy ratings (outside iVR), used in analysis of previous Recall and 3AFC data, 
were collected for all 20 objects for a) each of the 3AFC locations and b) their general 
expectancy in a kitchen context. 
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Recall was followed by a 3AFC recognition test, performed on a computer outside iVR. 
Each trial showed one studied object in three locations, one of which was correct. 
Importantly, the two foil locations were chosen to be approximately equally expected 
according to the normative ratings (see above), so using prior knowledge to guess the 
location would not help performance. Participants indicated which they thought was the 
studied location, followed by a rating of their confidence on a 3-point scale (1 = “did not 
see the object”, 2 = “guess the object was there”, 3 = “know the object was there”). In 
the final phase, participants provided expectancy ratings for how likely they thought it 
would be to find each of the 20 objects in each of the three locations tested in 3AFC, 
together with an additional rating of the general expectancy of an object appearing 
anywhere in a kitchen at all. Ratings were made using a sliding scale from unexpected (-
100) to expected (+100). These ratings were analogous to the normative ratings, but 
allowed for potential individual differences in expectancy. The range of expectancy 
ratings for each participant and object (by number) is apparent in Figure 2.4.  
Statistical analysis 
Statistical analysis was performed in R  (R Core Team, 2019) using Bayesian multi-level 
models with brms (Bürkner, 2017, version 2.12.0 2018) based on Stan (Carpenter et al., 
2017). All analyses scripts and data are available here: https://osf.io/4sw2t/ and 
https://github.com/JAQuent/schemaVR. 
Memory for individual trials was modelled as a function of a participant’s object-location 
expectancy rating. Memory was a binary outcome (correct/incorrect) and was fitted using 
logistic regression models with the Bernoulli linking function. A “full” model was fit 
first, with random slopes and intercepts for both objects and participants. Bayes Factors 
(BFs) using marginal likelihoods from bridge sampling  (Gronau et al., 2017) were then 
used to compare the full model with the model with random intercepts only, which was 
in turn compared to the model without random intercepts. 
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Figure 2.4: Illustration the spread of all object-location expectancy ratings: On the 
x-axis are the ratings collected from each participant (y-axis) tested across all three 
experiments (i.e. panel labelled 1, 2 and 3). Numbers represent the objects (see Table 
1) and are coloured orange if they are generally expected in the kitchen and purple 
if they are not. 
The individually-defined expectancy ratings (Figure 2.4) were scaled to have a standard 
deviation (SD) of 0.5, and the prior for each regression coefficient was based on a 
“Student t” distribution, with hyperparameters of df = 7, μ = 0, σ = 1, except for the 
intercept, which had hyperparameters of df = 7, μ = 0, σ = 10 (see 
https://jaquent.github.io/post/the-priors-that-i-use-for-logsitic-regression-now/ for 
justification; see also Table 7.1 ahead). These generic weakly informative priors are 
chosen to regularise unexpectedly large effects (Gelman et al., 2008). Eight Markov chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) chains were run, with 2000 warm-up and 16000 regular iterations 
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and a total of 112,000 post-warmup samples for each main model. All models converged 
with an ?̂? of 1. 
Evidence for or against my hypotheses were quantified with BFs for the linear and 
quadratic component of a second-order polynomial expansion of expectancy. A 
symmetrical U-shape would have a positive quadratic coefficient and a zero linear 
coefficient (see Experiment 3b for a more stringent test based on opposite signs of 
interrupted linear regression). The BF for each coefficient was estimated by the Savage-
Dickey ratio (Wagenmakers et al., 2010). The test for the quadratic term was order-
restricted (one-tailed) in line with my pre-registered hypothesis, all other tests were not 
order-restricted unless otherwise specified. For restricted tests, I compared the density of 
the truncated and renormalised prior distributions at zero with the logspline non-
parametric density estimate of the truncated and renormalised posterior distributions of 
my parameters at zero (based on the 112,000 post-warm-up samples). For unrestricted 
tests, BFs were just density ratios at zero: of prior/posterior (𝐵𝐹10) or posterior/prior 
(𝐵𝐹01) without truncation and renormalisation. The Savage-Dickey ratio function used 
can be found in this GitHub repository: https://github.com/JAQuent/assortedRFunction. 
In addition to BFs, I report 95 % credible intervals around my parameters, which can be 
interpreted as evidence against the null hypotheses if they do not include zero.  
Finally, when testing the means across trials, BFs were derived from Bayesian t-tests  
(Rouder et al., 2009)  with the package ‘Bayes factor’ (version 0.9.12-4.2), with the 
default scale parameter of √2/2.  
Results 
Objects that were reported as ‘not seen’ were excluded from further analysis. Across both 
the recall and 3AFC task, a mean of 2.84 (SD = 1.96) objects were excluded.  
For the recall data (Figure 2.5A), a model with random intercepts for participants and 
objects was used, since this was favoured relative to one that also included random slopes 
(BF = 1020) and relative to one that did not have random intercepts (BF = 1590). There 
was inconclusive evidence for a linear effect, 𝛽 = 0.096 (95 % CI [-0.663, 0.885]), BF10 
= 0.39, but more importantly, there was strong evidence for the predicted positive 
quadratic effect, 𝛽 = 1.888 (95 % CI [0.315, 3.641]), BF10 = 25.04.  
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Figure 2.5: Accuracy results: Recall (left panels) and recognition (right panels) 
performance plotted across expectancy ratings for all four Experiments 1, 2, 3a and 
3b (rows). The red line shows locally weighted smoothing (loess) of data to illustrate 
how well the fitted 2nd-order polynomial model using propagated evidence (white 
line) represents the data. The thin grey lines show 1,000 randomly selected fits from 
the posterior distributions, illustrating the uncertainty of the fit. Expectancy ratings 
originally ranged from -100 to +100, but were scaled to have SD = 0.5 in order to 
enable standard priors. 
It is possible that the two sides of the U-shape arise at different stages, e.g., an advantage 
in encoding unexpected locations and an advantage in retrieving expected locations. To 
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test the latter – i.e., whether expectancy influenced retrieval (e.g. guessing) – I compared 
the mean expectancy of incorrectly versus correctly recalled locations. Confirming 
expectations, the mean expectancy of incorrectly recalled locations was +40.7 (14.38), 
which was greater than zero, and greater than that for correctly recalled locations of +2.9 
(10.6), BF10 = 23900, d = 2.19, supporting a bias for participants to report expected 
locations when unsure.  
The 3AFC foils were designed to control for this potential bias towards recalling expected 
locations. Like for the recall data above, model comparison showed that the 3AFC data 
were better fit by a model with random intercepts but not random slopes, relative to the 
full model with random slopes (BF = 717) or the minimal model with no random 
intercepts or slopes (BF = 19.45). This model again showed inconclusive evidence for or 
against a linear effect, 𝛽 = 0.29 (95 % CI [-0.48, 1.12]), BF10 = 0.49. However, in this 
case, the evidence for a quadratic effect was also inconclusive, 𝛽 = 0.64 (95 % CI [-0.72, 
2.07]), BF10 = 1.61 (Figure 2.5B).  
In addition to 3AFC accuracy, high confidence (predicting 3 = “know the object was 
there” vs the other response options) was modelled with the same structure used above. 
Here, anecdotal evidence against a linear component, 𝛽  = -0.008 (95 % CI [-0.651, 
0.692]). BF10 = 0.331, and inconclusive evidence for a quadratic term, 𝛽 = 1.009 (95 % 
CI [-0.25, 2.378]). BF10 = 2.01, was found.  
Discussion 
Experiment 1 confirmed the predicted U-shape function for recall of object locations as 
a function of the expectancy of those locations. However, this U-shape was not replicated 
when using accuracy from a 3AFC recognition test in which the foils were matched for 
expectancy, suggesting that some aspects of the U-shape might arise during retrieval 
rather than encoding, such as the bias towards guessing expected locations that was also 
observed. Yet, when predicting high confidence responses in the 3AFC there was at least 
inconclusive evidence in the right direction that there might be a U-shape. Nonetheless, 
the evidence from the 3AFC data was moot, and more data might be required to provide 
more compelling evidence.  
Furthermore, a potential confound in Experiment 1 was that kitchen objects tended to be 
in highly congruent/incongruent locations, while non-kitchen objects primarily occupied 
by neutral locations. Even though random intercepts were allowed for each object, this 
meant that the U-shape might in part be explained by some theoretical difference between 
Novelty, Prediction Error and Memory Encoding: Limitations of the PIMMS framework 
38  Jörn Alexander Quent - November 2021 
kitchen vs non-kitchen objects, other than location expectancy and other individual 
differences between objects. I addressed this in the next experiment.  
2.4 Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was powered to have a better chance of detecting the predicted U-shape in 
3AFC accuracy. The procedure was identical to Experiment 1, except that the specific 
object-locations studied were re-selected (from the normative ratings) to give a more even 
coverage across the range of expectancy values for both kitchen and non-kitchen objects. 
The only other important difference is that participants were also asked to indicate the 
quality of their memory responses by using ‘remember/familiar/guess’ judgements 
(Gardiner et al., 2002; Rajaram, 1993). This was to test the second hypothesis of SLIMM, 
that the two ends of the U-shape would be associated with different types of memory, 
specifically recollection for unexpected locations and familiarity for expected locations. 
While it is traditionally assumed that recollection tends to be associated with high 
confidence and familiarity is not synonymous with low confidence (in that people can be 
very confident because of a strong feeling of familiarity in the absence of recollection) 
based on the seminal findings of Gardiner & Java (1990). However it can be questioned 
if that still holds given recent carefully pre-registered failed replication attempts (Haaf et 
al., 2021). Despite these concerns I decided that estimating recollection and familiarity 
are worthwhile in this case. Beyond that a final caveat concerns the fact that typically 
recollection and familiarity are measured for item recognition (Yonelinas, 2002) but here 
it is done for an associative memory type (object-location). This experiment was pre-
registered on OSF (https://osf.io/s9er3).  
Methods 
Participants 
I collected data from 25 new participants. These had a mean age of 24.52 (SD = 2.83) 
years, with 18 females, 6 males and 1 non-binary. Sample size was determined based on 
frequentist power analysis to achieve 80 % power (https://osf.io/gr98d/) based on the 
quadratic effect size (𝛽 = 0.51 on unit scale) for 3AFC (https://osf.io/s9er3).  
Materials 
The only change from Experiment 1 was that objects were now reshuffled to other 
locations, so that kitchen and non-kitchen objects were more evenly distributed across 
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(normative) expectancy ratings. To address the problem that ‘kitchen’ objects tended to 
be in extreme positions, only the “SS of targets” for kitchen objects was used; otherwise 
the algorithm remained unchanged. This ensured that kitchen objects now also occupied 
middle locations, while the spread of non-kitchen objects was still adequate. I will call 
this Set 2, as distinct from the Set 1 used in Experiment 1. 
Procedure 
The only procedural change was how participants categorised their memory responses for 
both recall and 3AFC (replacing the previous categories based on confidence only): If 
they did not remember seeing the object at all, they were told to indicate “no memory”. 
If they remembered the object itself, but had little idea where it was, they were to indicate 
“guess”. If they did not initially remember where it was, but once they had placed it (in 
recall) or compared the three choices (in 3AFC), that location just looked familiar, they 
were to indicate “familiar”. Finally, if they immediately remembered where the object 
was when they saw it (because, for instance, they remembered what they thought when 
they saw the object), then they were to indicate “remember”.  
Statistical analysis 
Parts of the statistical analysis were identical to Experiment 1, with BFs based on the 
same zero-centred priors. However, I also used the posterior distributions of Experiment 
1 as prior distributions by estimating the family-specific parameters of the Student’s t-
distribution for those distributions (see Table 7.1) using brms. For that, I used the 
marginal distribution, ignoring any correlation between parameters, and used the same 
factor to scale expectancy ratings as in Experiment 1, to ensure comparable expectancy 
ratings across experiments and hence correct priors (so the SD of these ratings in 
Experiment 2 was close to, but not identical to, 0.5). The BF from this second model 
allowed me to update the posterior belief in favour of my hypotheses (what I call “𝑃𝐵10”), 
given the data from both experiments (calculated by multiplying this BF with the BF from 
the previous experiment).  
Given the results of Experiment 1, random intercepts were modelled but not random 
slopes. Remember/familiar judgements were initially analysed in line with pre-registered 
analysis of the mean expectancy rating for remember and familiar judgments, but further 
simulation showed that this trial-averaged analysis is biased by boundary effects on 
expectancy values (see Appendix). Therefore, I analysed them using the same single-trial 
logistic regression model that I used for overall accuracy. To estimate the probability of 
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recollection, an outcome of 1 was used for “remember” judgments, and an outcome of 0 
otherwise. There is debate over the best way to estimate familiarity, i.e., whether 
familiarity and recollection are redundant, independent or exclusive (Knowlton & Squire, 
1995). To model redundancy, familiarity was estimated with an outcome of 1 for 
“remember” or “familiar” responses, and 0 otherwise; to model independence, an 
outcome of 1 was used for “familiar” responses, but only trials that were not given a 
“remember” response were included; to model exclusivity, familiarity was estimated as 
for independence, and recollection was estimated by an outcome of 1 for “remember” 
responses, but only trials that were not given a “familiar” response were included.  
Results 
An average of 2.68 (SD = 2.52) objects were reported as ‘not seen’ and therefore excluded 
from further analysis. The distribution of individual expectancy ratings for kitchen and 
non-kitchen objects was also more evenly spread across expectancy (Figure 2.4).  
For recall (Figure 2.5C), there was inconclusive evidence for a linear term, BF10 = 3.25, 
𝛽 = 0.407 (95 % CI [-0.074, 0.897]), PB10 = 0.91, and more importantly, continued very 
strong evidence for a positive quadratic term, BF10 = 2.5, 𝛽 = 1.538 (95 % CI [0.445, 
2.635]), PB10 = 65.35. Like Experiment 1, the average expectancy for incorrectly-placed 
objects was +34.49 (16.59) and so clearly higher than for correctly-placed, which was -
4.54 (14.58), BF10 = 174000, d = 1.51 
Focusing on the 3AFC therefore, there was a clear linear term, BF10 = 104.69, 𝛽 = 0.749 
(95 % CI [0.26, 1.252]), PB10 = 22.73, and more importantly, a clear quadratic term, BF10 
= 6.71, 𝛽  = 1.169 (95 % CI [0.18, 2.182]), PB10 = 13.72. The positive linear term 
produced an asymmetry in the U-shape towards expected locations (Figure 2.5D). 
Assuming that recollection and familiarity are independent, the estimate of recollection 
from 3AFC responses (Figure 2.6A) showed inconclusive evidence for a linear term, BF10 
= 0.46, 𝛽 = 0.292 (95 % CI [-0.212, 0.81]), but strong evidence for a quadratic term, BF10 
= 19.29, 𝛽 = 1.479 (95 % CI [0.394, 2.633]). By comparison, the estimate of familiarity 
(Figure 2.6B) showed anecdotal evidence against a linear term, BF10 = 0.31, 𝛽 = 0.099 
(95 % CI [-0.497, 0.705]), but inconclusive evidence for and against a quadratic term, 
BF10 = 0.60, 𝛽 = 0.102 (95 % CI [-1.119, 1.35]). For the recollection estimate under 
exclusivity, there was no linear effect, BF10 = 0.50, 𝛽 = 0.322 (95 % CI [-0.3, 0.971]), and 
anecdotal evidence for a quadratic effect, BF10 = 4.17, 𝛽 = 1.317 (95 % CI [0.005, 2.756]). 
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For familiarity scored under the redundancy assumption, there was anecdotal evidence 
against a linear effect, BF10 = 0.33, 𝛽 = 0.186 (95 % CI [-0.35, 0.743]), but inconclusive 
evidence for a quadratic effect, BF10 = 2.18, 𝛽 = 0.962 (95 % CI [-0.145, 2.141]).  
 
Figure 2.6: Recollection & familiarity results: 3AFC recognition performance based 
on recollection (under independent or redundant scoring, left panel) and familiarity 
(under independent or exclusive scoring, right panel) estimates across Experiment 
2, Experiment 3a and Experiment 3b (rows). The red line shows locally weighted 
smoothing (loess) of data to illustrate how well the average model (the white line) 
represents the data. The thin grey lines show 1,000 randomly selected fits from the 
posterior distributions, to illustrate the uncertainty of the average model. 
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Expectancy originally ranged from -100 to +100, but were scaled to have a SD = 0.5 
in order to enable standard priors. 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated the U-shape in recall of Experiment 1, using a more even 
distribution of kitchen/non-kitchen objects across expectancy values, but now also found 
a U-shape in 3AFC, which rules out a contribution from guessing expected locations. This 
confirmed the first of my original hypotheses. However, the results provided strong 
evidence against my second hypothesis, that the advantage for unexpected locations 
would be accompanied by recollection, while that for expected locations would be 
accompanied by familiarity. Rather, I found that both ends of the U-shape were 
accompanied by recollection, whereas familiarity showed little variation as a function of 
expectancy, regardless how recollection and familiarity were scored.  
One limitation of Experiments 1-2 is that the same set of 20 object-location pairings were 
used for all participants (even if they were changed slightly across experiments), raising 
the possibility that the U-shape was a quirk of these particular pairings. Therefore, for 
Experiment 3a and 3b, I created five new sets of object-location pairings, counterbalanced 
across participants, to check whether the U-shape generalised. 
2.5 Experiment 3a 
Experiment 3a was run to check whether I could replicate the U-shape again, particularly 
in 3AFC, but this time across a large range of object-location pairings. For this, five 
distinct sets (i.e. unique object-location pairing pairings) were created and to which 
participants were randomly assigned. 
Methods 
Participants 
25 participants were recruited to take part in the study, but one was excluded from further 
processing due to experimenter error by which they rated different stimuli to those 
presented in the study. Hence a total of 24 participants (11 females and 13 males, mean 
age 25 years, SD = 3.71 years) were included in the analysis. This means that the data is 
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not completely counterbalanced across the 5 stimulus sets. This experiment was pre-
registered at (https://osf.io/kcr2q). 
Materials, Procedure & Statistic analysis 
Methods were identical to Experiment 2, except that five new sets of 20 object-location 
pairings were based on the normative data (Sets 3-7; see Appendix Table 7.2), each 
chosen to maximise the range of expectancy values (materials available here 
https://osf.io/4sw2t/ and https://github.com/JAQuent/schemaVR). 
Results  
An average of 2.12 (SD = 1.53) objects were reported as ‘not seen’ and excluded from 
further analysis.  
For recall (Figure 2.5E), the results showed anecdotal evidence against a linear term, BF10 
= 0.22, 𝛽 = 0.189 (95 % CI [-0.144, 0.522]), PB10 = 0.30, but very strong evidence for a 
quadratic term, BF10 = 1.33, 𝛽 = 1.15 (95 % CI [0.351, 1.945]), PB10 = 59.47. Like 
Experiment 1 and 2, the average expectancy for incorrectly-placed objects M = +37.39 
(SD = 15.69) was clearly higher than for correctly-placed objects M = +1.08 (SD = 14.18), 
BF10 = 663000, d = 1.7. 
For 3AFC (Figure 2.5F), there was very strong evidence for a linear term, BF10 = 0.88, 𝛽 
= 0.59 (95 % CI [0.233, 0.949]), PB10 = 41.82, but there also strong evidence for a 
quadratic term, BF10 = 2.32, 𝛽 = 1.137 (95 % CI [0.348, 1.928]), PB10 = 43.09. 
For recollection estimates from 3AFC under independence scoring (Figure 2.6C), there 
was moderate evidence against a linear term, BF10 = 0.26, 𝛽 = 0.026 (95 % CI [-0.311, 
0.36]), PB10 = 0.166, but more importantly, extreme evidence for a quadratic term, BF10 
= 5.74, 𝛽 = 1.475 (95 % CI [0.682, 2.27]), PB10 = 506.17. For familiarity (Figure 2.6D), 
there was anecdotal evidence against a linear, BF10 = 0.36, 𝛽 = -0.177 (95 % CI [-0.793, 
0.445]), PB10 = 0.22, as well as inconclusive evidence either way regarding the quadratic 
term, BF10 = 0.61, 𝛽 = 0.092 (95 % CI [-1.127, 1.335]), PB10 = 0.48.  
For recollection estimated under exclusivity, I found no linear effect, BF10 = 0.26, 𝛽 = 
0.027 (95 % CI [-0.393, 0.447]), PB10 = 0.205, and very strong evidence for a quadratic 
effect, BF10 = 5.74, 𝛽 = 1.442 (95 % CI [0.468, 2.428]), PB10 = 59.1. For familiarity 
scored under the redundancy assumption, there was no linear effect, BF10 = 0.34, 𝛽 = -
0.047 (95 % CI [-0.422, 0.327]), PB10 = 0.185, but moderate evidence for quadratic effect, 
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BF10 = 1.55, 𝛽 = 1.009 (95 % CI [0.169, 1.854]), PB10 = 6.69, which can be traced back 
to the contribution of recollection.  
Discussion 
In general, Experiment 3a confirmed the U-shape function for both recall and recognition 
as a function of object-location expectancy, particularly when combined with 
Experiments 1 and 2, and confirmed that both ends of this U-shape were associated with 
recollection. However, the BF for a positive U-shape in 3AFC (regardless of 
recollection/familiarity) was not strong, BF10 = 2.32, which may reflect weaker effects 
for some of the new stimulus sets, and there was also continued evidence (when combined 
across all experiments) for an accompanying positive linear effect for 3AFC, which could 
swamp a true U-shape (see Figure 2.5F). Therefore I decided to collect more data with 
these stimulus sets, so as to allow a more stringent test of a U-shape: namely, interrupted 
regression that tests whether both ends of the U-shape are independently reliable (see 
later). These data were collected as part of the novelty experiment in Chapter 3. 
2.6 Experiment 3b 
Experiment 3b was identical to Experiment 3a, except that the participants had previously 
studied a list of unrelated words for the novelty experiment described in Chapter 3.  
Methods 
Participants 
 A total of 72 participants (50 females, 21 male and 1 non-binary, mean age 26.12 years, 
SD = 6.53 years) were tested, counterbalanced across the 5 stimulus sets. Note that the 
sets were not fully counterbalanced across participants (see later). Prior to this 
experiment, the participants had previously also made judgments about a list of 288 
words, as part of a separate Registered Report examining the effect of the subsequent iVR 
experience on incidental memory for those words (see Chapter 3). The words were not 
related to kitchens or the objects used in the iVR phase, and participants were told the 
words were not relevant to the iVR phase. This experiment was also pre-registered at OSF 
(https://osf.io/b9dqg).  
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Results  
An average of 2.31 (SD = 1.65) objects were reported as ‘not seen’ and excluded from 
further analysis.  
For recall (Figure 2.5G), the results showed inconclusive evidence against a linear term, 
BF10 = 0.21, 𝛽 = -0.007 (95 % CI [-0.225, 0.208]), PB10 = 0.11, but extreme evidence for 
a quadratic term, BF10 = 8.27, 𝛽 = 0.991 (95 % CI [0.462, 1.522]), PB10 = 553.68. Like 
Experiment 1, 2 and 3a, the average expectancy for incorrectly-placed objects M = +23.44 
(SD = 22.33) was clearly higher than for correctly-placed objects M = -9.06 (SD = 25.32), 
BF10 = 1.46e+10, d = 1.09. 
For 3AFC (Figure 2.5H), there was inconclusive evidence for or against a linear term, 
BF10 = 0.24, 𝛽  = 0.177 (95 % CI [-0.067, 0.417]), PB10 = 0.42, but strong evidence 
remained for a quadratic term, BF10 = 0.8, 𝛽 = 0.8 (95 % CI [0.227, 1.37]), PB10 = 25.85. 
For recollection estimates from 3AFC under independent scoring (Figure 2.6E), there was 
extreme (additional) evidence for a linear term, BF10 = 1545.95, 𝛽 = -0.353 (95 % CI [-
0.568, -0.144]), which held even when combined with previous experiments, PB10 = 
23.12, but also, strong evidence for a quadratic term, BF10 = 0.8, 𝛽 = 0.949 (95 % CI 
[0.425, 1.473]), PB10 = 258.15. For familiarity under independent scoring (Figure 2.6F), 
there was anecdotal evidence against a linear, BF10 = 0.19, 𝛽 = -0.037 (95 % CI [-0.324, 
0.254]), PB10 = 0.20, an inconclusive evidence regarding the quadratic, BF10 = 0.51, 𝛽 = 
0.245 (95 % CI [-0.414, 0.906]), PB10 = 0.42, term. For recollection estimate under 
exclusivity, I found a strong linear effect, BF10 = 1550, 𝛽 = -0.361 (95 % CI [-0.641, -
0.085]), PB10 = 8.84, and moderate evidence for a quadratic effect, BF10 = 0.8, 𝛽 = 1.097 
(95 % CI [0.43, 1.762]), PB10 = 7.55. For familiarity scored under the redundancy 
assumption, there was inconclusive evidence regarding a linear effect, BF10 = 4.28, 𝛽 = -
0.25 (95 % CI [-0.497, -0.005]), PB10 = 1.52, but moderate evidence for quadratic effect, 
BF10 = 0.9, 𝛽 = 0.792 (95 % CI [0.214, 1.372]), PB10 = 3.68. 
The combined evidence across experiments (see PB) for a quadratic term in the absence 
of a linear effect is consistent with a U-shaped function. However, a stronger test is to 
check that both ends of a U-shape are reliable, by testing for opposite linear slopes; so-
called “interrupted regression” (e.g. Simonsohn, 2018). As pre-registered (see 
https://osf.io/b9dqg), I tested this by combining data across all experiments. To determine 
slopes of interrupted linear regressions, one must find a “breaking-point” (bp) somewhere 
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along the continuum, at which the two slopes meet. This was done by fitting these two 
models: 
y ~ xlow + xhigh + high + set3 + (1 | participant number) + (1 | object number)  
where:  
 
For Slope 1: 
x = object/location expectancy that is transformed to  
xlow = x – bp if x <= bp and 0 otherwise,  
xhigh = x – bp if x > bp and 0 otherwise, and 
high = 1 if x > bp and 0 otherwise.  
 
For Slope 2:  
x = object/location expectancy that is transformed to 
xlow = x – bp if x < bp and 0 otherwise,  
xhigh = x – bp if x >= bp and 0 otherwise, and 
high = 1 if x >= bp and 0 otherwise. 
 
These models were applied to 10 equally-spaced breaking points within the middle 80% 
range of the expectancy ratings. Simulations showed that the false positive rate remained 
under 5% for testing these 10 breaking points for accepting a BF10 > 6 as evidence (see 
https://jaquent.github.io/post/finding-a-u-shape-with-bayesian-interrupted-regression/). 
For recall, the strongest effect was with a breakpoint of +0.06 (9.24 in original scale), 




3 Note that I originally pre-registered to model experiment as well as set but this was mistake as Set 1 and 
Set 2 would be modelled twice. Now, set is modelled as a combination of set and experiment leading to a 
regressor that has 12 levels (Set 1, Set 2, Set 3 for Experiment 3a, …, Set 3 for Experiment 3b, …). 
Chapter 2: The expected case 
Jörn Alexander Quent - November 2021   47 
(95 % CI [-1.30, -0.28]), BF10 = 54.89, and the rightward slope was 𝛽 = +0.69 (95 % CI 
[0.06, 1.34]), BF10 = 6.27. For 3AFC, the best breakpoint of -0.26 (-34.3 in original scale) 
had a leftward slope of 𝛽 = -0.84 (95 % CI [-1.77, 0.12]), BF10 = 3.93, and a rightward 
slope of 𝛽 = +0.50 (95 % CI [0.10, 0.92]), BF10 = 8.48. Note though that the leftward 
slope fell below the BF10 criterion that I set (BF10 > 6). For recollection estimates of 
3AFC, the best breakpoint of +0.22 (30 in original scale) had a leftward slope of 𝛽 = -
0.84 (95 % CI [-1.23, -0.45]), BF10 = 619.55, and rightward slope of 𝛽 = +1.22 (95 % CI 
[0.37, 2.10]), BF10 = 40.45. These results provide strong support for both sides of the U-
shape being reliable in recall and for recollection in particular. Full results, including for 
familiarity that did not show any indication of U-shape, can be found in Table 7.3 to Table 
7.6 in the Appendix. 
Effect of Stimulus Set 
Even though PB remained supportive for a U-shape in the critical 3AFC test, the BFs for 
Experiment 3a and 3b separately were weaker than in Experiment 2 (and to a lesser extent, 
than in Experiment 1). This raises the possibility that some sets of object-location pairings 
give stronger U-shapes than others. 
 
Figure 2.7: 3AFC accuracy as a function of set: Blue line represents the LOESS line 
to illustrate the ‘raw’ relationship between expectancy and 3AFC accuracy. The 
number in parenthesis represents the set number in the data.  
To test this, I combined data from all Experiments, treating Experiment 1 and Experiment 
2 as their own sets. Figure 2.7 suggests that there was variability between the sets with 
respect to whether they produce a U-shape. First I examined whether the distribution of 
expectancy values varied across the different sets. For this, I binned the expectancy values 
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into 8 bins and calculated the frequency of assignment for each bin. Then, I calculated 
the absolute difference for each bin from the average of all bins. This analysis revealed 
that set 4 (246), the set that seems to show an inverted U-shape, and set 5 (388), the set 
that eyeballing showed the strongest U-shape, have very similar values, suggesting that 
the stimulus sets do not differ much in their expectancy distribution. Second, I inspected 
each set with to check whether any particular idiosyncratic pairing of object/location (e.g. 
an unexpected or expected pairing that is difficult to see and therefore associated with 
low accuracy) might explain the differences; however I could find no obvious 
explanation.  
Finally, in order to formally investigate this question, I fitted three models using the 
pooled data from all experiments. The first model also allowed the factor “set” with seven 
levels as to interact with the linear and the quadratic component of expectancy; the second 
model included the factor set only as a fixed effect; the third model did not include the 
set factor at all. The function bayes_factor() was used to compare the different models, 
which all used zero-centred priors as previously described. These models were run with 
all measures (recall, 3AFC and recollection) that exhibited a U-shape in the previous 
iterations of the experiment. For those, the model including set was favoured over the 
model that also included interactions between set and expectancy (recall BF10 = 2290, 
3AFC BF10 = 15.2, recollection BF10 = 109). At the same time, the simplest model that 
did not include set at all was better still, for all measures (recall BF10 = 129, 3AFC BF10 
= 13.9, recollection BF10 = 229). Because there was no evidence that the stimulus set 
affected performance, particularly in interacting with expectancy (despite the numerical 
differences in Figure 2.6), I think I am justified in propagating evidence across 
experiments, as done in this chapter.  
Pooled vs Propagated Evidence 
To check that the propagation of Bayesian evidence was itself accurate, despite ignoring 
any posterior dependencies between parameter values, I checked that the BF from the 
pooled data was similar to the final PB after Experiment 3b. For recall, the pooled 
estimate of the linear effect (𝛽 = 0.07, 95 % CI [-0.13, 0.27]) had a BF10 = 0.12 which is 
comparable to PB10 = 0.35 reported for Experiment 3b above; while the pooled estimate 
of the quadratic effect (𝛽  = 0.957, 95 % CI [0.464, 1.452]) had a BF10 = 306, again 
comparable to the above PB10 = 554. For 3AFC, the pooled estimate of the linear effect 
(𝛽 = 0.182, 95 % CI [-0.035, 0.4]) had a BF10 = 0.415, comparable to the above PB10 = 
0.42, while the pooled estimate of the quadratic effect (𝛽 = 0.798, 95 % CI [0.278, 1.32]) 
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had a BF10 = 23.2, comparable to the above PB10 = 25.85. Finally, for recollection, the 
pooled estimate of the linear effect 𝛽 = -0.33, 95 % CI [-0.529, -0.132]) had a BF10 = 
18.4, comparable to the above PB10 = 23.1, while the pooled estimate of the quadratic 
effect (𝛽 = 0.95, 95 % CI [0.465, 1.439]) had a BF10 = 370, comparable to the above PB10 
= 258. Finally, I also confirmed that reversing the order of calculating PB, i.e. using 
posteriors from Experiment 3b as priors on Experiment 3a, etc, produced exactly the same 
final PB value, as expected. 
Discussion 
Experiment 3b generally confirmed the U-shape function for both recall and recognition 
as a function of object-location expectancy, particularly when combining evidence with 
Experiments 1, 2 and 3a, and confirmed that both ends of this U-shape were associated 
with recollection. This was apparent by strong evidence for a positive quadratic 
component, and in more strict interrupted regression analyses, which provided anecdotal 
to strong evidence that both sides of the U-shape showed a significant linear effect of 
opposite sign. The weakest evidence was a BF10 of 3.93 for the leftward slope for 3AFC, 
i.e., the unexpected side of the U-shape, which fell just below the criterion of at least BF 
= 5.66 that simulations4 showed controlled the false positive rate for the 10 break points 
tested. Nonetheless, the finding that there was evidence against a linear component to the 
overall fit (only evidence for a quadratic component) suggests that the dependency of 
3AFC on expectancy really is U-shaped. Interestingly, the overall fit for recollection did 
show evidence for a negative linear effect (in addition to a positive quadratic component), 
suggesting that, while the interrupted regression confirmed that both ends of the 
recollection dependency were reliable, there was an additional bias towards better 
recollection of unexpected locations. 
2.7 General Discussion 
I was able to confirm my first prediction that memory can be a U-shaped function of the 
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unexpected information. This prediction was derived from the SLIMM model that 
presumes that different brain systems underlie the two ends of the expectancy dimension, 
and reconciles many previous studies that have claimed superior memory for either 
expected (schema-congruent) information or unexpected (surprising) events: whether one 
finds one advantage or the other depends on the relative position of the two experimental 
conditions along the expectancy continuum. Only by exploring a continuous and extreme 
range of expectancy can one see the larger picture.  
The present finding replicates and extends the previous demonstration of a U-shape using 
three experimental conditions (Greve et al., 2019), and importantly demonstrates that the 
U-shape also occurs using rich, pre-experimental knowledge, rather than a simple rule 
learned during an experiment. Indeed, my use of iVR allowed me to test memory quickly 
(less than a minute of encoding) in a realistic situation, while simultaneously providing 
the precise experimental control needed to measure memory.  
The present results are at odds with another study that featured three ordinal conditions 
that differed in expectancy (van der Linden et al., 2017). In that study, participants viewed 
sequences containing four object images, where all four belonged to the same theme (i.e. 
expected condition), or did not follow a particular theme (i.e. baseline condition), or the 
first three objects followed a theme but the fourth object violated it (i.e. unexpected 
condition). No differences between conditions were found in an immediate item 
recognition task, but after 24 hours, recognition performance for the fourth object in the 
expected condition was better than in the other two conditions. Interestingly, this result is 
unlikely to be due to schema-congruent guessing, because lures that were from the same 
theme as the schema-congruent targets were not falsely recognised more often than lures 
that were not related to any theme that was used.  
This lack of any advantage for van der Linden et al.’s unexpected condition relative to 
their baseline condition is difficult to reconcile with my findings and with SLIMM. One 
possible reason could be that their unexpected condition was simply not potent enough. 
Another possibility relates to their recognition task, which might have been based more 
on familiarity than recollection (particularly perceptual familiarity, since perceptually-
similar lures did show increased false alarms). The “local PE” of PIMMS predicts that 
PE increases associations between the predictor (preceding three objects) and the 
(un)predicted object, but not necessarily memory for the object itself (so would predict 
an advantage in unexpected condition relative to baseline if associative memory were 
tested instead, e.g., “what stimulus came after this one?”). Any transient changes between 
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PIMMS’s item and feature levels (which underlie familiarity) would not necessarily differ 
across conditions. The “global PE” of SLIMM, on the other hand, would predict that the 
surprising object in the unexpected condition triggers an episodic snapshot, which should 
improve recollection of that object (by associating it with co-occurring context), but it is 
still possible that recognition was dominated by familiarity, so such improved recollection 
played little role. This “item recognition” contrasts with my 3AFC task, which explicitly 
tested the association between an object and its location in the kitchen (see Chapter 5 for 
further discussion).  
My results may reconcile those from previous studies that have examined memory for 
objects within familiar types of rooms. In their seminal work, Brewer and Treyens (1981) 
reported that memory was positively correlated with schema expectancy. However, the 
opposite effect, where atypical objects in a room were remembered better, has also been 
reported (Lampinen et al., 2000, 2001; Pezdek et al., 1989; Prull, 2015). The discrepancy 
between these studies most likely reflects two factors: 1) with only restricted range of 
expectancy, the relative level of memory depends on the position of those points on the 
U-shaped continuum (as noted above), and 2) the precise type of memory assessed. Both 
of these issues apply, for example, to the study of Lew and Howe (2017), which is most 
similar to the present study, except that it used realistic photos of familiar room-types5. 
Like here, the photos showed room-congruent objects at expected and unexpected 
locations, as well as room-incongruent objects. At test, objects either stayed in same 
location or shifted to a different location. Recognition of objects was better for room-
incongruent objects as well as room-congruent objects at unexpected locations, relative 




5 The only previous study to investigate memory for objects using iVR, of which I am aware, was by 
Draschkow & Võ (2017). These authors examined how room schemas influence interactions with, and 
memory for, objects. Participants were asked to either arrange objects in a virtual room in a manner that 
was consistent or inconsistent with their expected arrangement. Participants spent more time handling and 
searching for inconsistently arranged objects, and consistently arranged objects were recalled more 
accurately than inconsistently arranged objects (possibly reflecting the guessing bias described above). 
While this study is a clever illustration of the use of iVR to study the effects of schema, it did not explicitly 
examine the continuous relationship between expectancy and memory. 
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recognition test was likely also influenced by memory for the object themselves, whether 
or not their location was switched (whereas here, I ignored the rare trials when an object 
was not recognised at all, and my “recognition” refers to recognition of the object’s 
location). Indeed, when Lew and Howe (2017) tested memory by recall instead, memory 
for room-congruent objects at unexpected locations was impaired relative to room-
congruent objects at expected locations. The authors explained this in terms of schemas 
acting differently on item and associative (location) memory, whereby an unexpected 
location attracts attention, but also activates schema-congruent bindings that interfere 
with memory (see also Bower et al., 1979). However, an alternative explanation for their 
dissociation between recognition and recall is that their recall test, but not recognition 
test, was influenced by guessing of room-congruent locations when memory failed 
(Bayen et al., 2000; Kleider et al., 2008; Konopka & Benjamin, 2009; Kuhlmann et al., 
2012). This is indeed what I found when examining errors in my recall test. By controlling 
for this guessing bias in my 3AFC, through matching the expectancy of the foils, I was 
able to reveal an additional advantage of memory for unexpected locations. Thus, it 
appears critical to not only explore a range of expectancy values, but also control for other 
ways in which schema can influence memory performance, such as at retrieval as well as 
encoding. 
With regard to the second prediction derived from SLIMM, namely that one side of the 
U-shape (high unexpectancy) would be associated with recollection of contextual details, 
while the other side (high expectancy) would be associated only with a feeling of 
familiarity (see also Kafkas & Montaldi, 2018), my evidence does not support this 
prediction. Indeed, my Bayesian analysis provided evidence against any substantial effect 
of expectancy for familiarity, and evidence instead for a U-shaped function of 
recollection. One possibility is that the SLIMM conception of the relationship between 
expectancy/schema-congruency and recollection versus familiarity is incorrect. Another 
possibility is that my assessment of memory for the location of objects (rather than the 
objects themselves; see above) inherently requires the same associative mechanisms that 
support recollection (and which are assumed to be supported by the hippocampus/MTL 
system). One way to test the latter would be to examine memory for the objects 
themselves (such as their perceptual details), rather than their location, and see if such 
“item memory” is associated with recollection when the object was highly unexpected, 
but familiarity when the object was highly expected. However, an additional possibility 
is that the U-shape arose because I tried to measure recollection and familiarity for a 
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relatively unorthodox scenario (object-location memory) and that participants merely 
conflated recollection with high confidence responses.  
My study raises interesting future questions, though also possible limitations. One 
interesting question is whether the U-shape applies to all types of expectancy, or only 
predictions deriving from pre-existing knowledge, i.e. schema. For example, would the 
same U-shape emerge for events that are expected or unexpected given an episodic 
context, such as a temporal sequence of items that enable a prediction for the next item 
(e.g. Kumaran & Maguire, 2006, 2007, 2009). In this context, it is important to 
differentiate the two dimensions of novelty (never seen – completely familiar) and of 
expectedness (unexpected – expected). These dimensions intersect in a non-orthogonal 
pattern, which implies that they are also not parallel or identical. For instance, given a 
certain context a familiar object can be unexpected and furthermore something can be 
rare but still experienced before hence generally familiar. Based on this distinction,  I 
expect a U-shape only for the dimension of expectedness and even then merely if 
schematic knowledge is strong enough so it can help encoding. Based on this, I 
hypothesise one could observe a U-shape for a match vs. non-match paradigm with three 
conditions (order violation, random sequence and no order violation) provided that the 
sequences are studied well. This idea is lines well with the finding that the hippocampus 
is especially sensitive to mismatch (e.g. Kumaran & Maguire, 2006, 2007, 2009). 
However, while others have shown a U-shape for verbal rules (Greve et al., 2019), the 
same may not apply to other stimuli and other types of memory test. A second limitation 
of the present study is that I only tested immediate memory, and it is possible that the U-
shape changes as the retention interval increases, e.g., following consolidation processes 
that might occur overnight. Either way, my results demonstrate the important role of prior 
knowledge in shaping the encoding of new memories, and unify two factors (schema-
congruency versus surprise) that have previously tended to be studied separately. 
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3 EFFECT OF NOVELTY 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1, I discussed how BTT describes the phenomenon that experiencing 
something novel can boost memory for surrounding information, and how this 
phenomenon is not explained by PIMMS. One of the BTT’s claims, derived mainly from 
animal data, is that only initially weak memories benefit from this “novelty boost”. 
Furthermore, another hypothesis is that, at least for spatial novelty, hippocampus-
dependent memory should benefit the most, which might translate to enhanced 
recollection, though could in principle also lead to increased familiarity if we assume that 
familiarity typically represents weaker memory. In this chapter, I test hypotheses in 
humans.  
To do this, I attempted to demonstrate a retroactive effect of a novel spatial navigation 
experience on memory for unrelated words, as a function of the encoding task (deep vs. 
shallow) and retrieval quality (recognition with remember vs. know judgments, plus 
recall). For that, one half of the words were encoded deeply using an animate/inanimate 
task (like in Fenker et al., 2008), while the other half were encoded shallowly using an 
orthographic task, which results in worse memory, i.e. weaker encoding (Craik & 
Lockhart, 1972; Otten et al., 2001; Yonelinas, 2002). Encoding was incidental, i.e. I did 
not tell participants that their memory for the words would be tested later. Like 
Schomaker et al (2014), I also used VR, but in particular an immersive VR system in 
which participants can physically walk around a virtual room (rather than navigating with 
a controller, as in Schomaker et al., 2014). Due to the current rarity of immersive VR 
systems (compared to video games or even passive VR), I expect this to be a highly novel 
experience (and I excluded people who have experienced immersive VR before). Indeed, 
in my prior work with immersive VR (see Chapter 2), most participants were amazed by 
their experience. Immersive VR also renders the novel experience more similar to the 
open-field, spatial exploration used to induce novelty in non-human animals. To isolate 
the novelty of the experience from the sensory, motor and executive demands of the VR 
task, the control group had experienced the same VR task the day before, so it was no 
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longer novel. In summary, according to BTT, I expected to find: 1) a basic novelty effect 
(better memory for the preceding words in the novel group vs control group), 2) a greater 
novelty effect for shallowly than deeply encoded words, and 3) a novelty effect that is 
either larger or smaller for recollected words (Remember judgments) relative to words 
judged as familiar (Know judgments), depending on whether any boost is restricted to 




All participants were recruited from MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences’ SONA system, 
in-house participant panel or word-to-mouth. This study was approved by the Cambridge 
Psychology Research Ethics committee (PRE.2018.107). Data collection was stopped 
after data from 72 participants led to BF10 > 6 or < 1/6 for one of my planned comparisons 
(see Results), as registered. Participants were paid £6/h and received up to £3 for travel 
compensation per visit. Full payment was only made after successful completion of Day 
3. Note these were the same participants used in Experiment 3b of Chapter 2. 
Data collection had to be paused due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Approximately half of 
the participants completed the task before the pandemic and the rest after. The group ratio 
(novelty vs. control) at the beginning of the pandemic was circa 2.2 to 1 (and therefore 
reversed for participants tested after the COVID lock-down).   
82 participants were tested in total. Ten were excluded for the following reasons: three 
participants did not complete the recognition task the next day, two had technical failures, 
two datasets were invalid due to experimenter error, one felt unwell after Day 1, one had 
prior VR experience (a registered exclusion criterion) and one participant’s Pr was at 
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chance level, as defined by the bootstrapping procedure.6 A further four participants were 
included, except for tests for which they had missing data: one had missing recall data 
and the other missed the VR questionnaire. Furthermore, two participants did not use the 
correct keys so their data had to be excluded from the analysis of the encoding task. 
The final sample size of 72 participants contained 53 females, 18 males, 1 non-binary, 
with mean age M = 26.3 years (SD = 6.25 years). Participants in the Novelty group 
completed the online recognition task M = 25.5 hours (SD = 2.38 hours) after encoding, 
while the Control group completed the task after M = 25.1 hours (SD = 2.17 hours). 
Procedure 
In terms of which stimuli (see below) and the procedure I closely followed a previous 
paper by Otten et al. (2001), ensuring that memory performance was in the correct 
ballpark. The experiment ran over 3 days (see Figure 3.1), with Days 1-2 in the laboratory 
and Day 3 at home. On the critical Day 2, the experimental procedure can be divided into 
three phases: study, iVR and test phase. In the study phase, participants incidentally 
encoded words. The words were presented in four blocks, with one of the two study tasks 
(see below) in each block (counterbalanced across participants as ABBA or BAAB). Then 
they performed the iVR task (details below). The only difference between the Novelty 
and the Control group is that the Control group had already completed the iVR task the 
day before, but both completed a memory task in iVR. Finally, they freely recalled as 
many of the words as possible and completed a short questionnaire about the iVR 
experience. On the final Day 3, participants performed a recognition task with 
remember/know/new judgments to distinguish studied versus new (unstudied) words. I 
decided to test recall only on Day 2 and recognition memory only on Day 3 to minimise 




6 Note that I originally planned to remove participants with boot-strapped chance performance on the MPT 
parameters r and f. However some participants did not use both response options often enough to establish 
chance levels, so for the purpose of participant exclusion, I switched to the simpler Pr measure, collapsed 
across response options.  
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Figure 3.1: Task design: Panel A Illustration of experimental design: On day 1, the 
Control group was familiarised with the immersive virtual reality (iVR) task (see 
Panel B). Day 2 is the same for both the Novelty and the Control group. It started 
with the deep/shallow encoding task (see Panel C), immediately followed by the iVR 
task. This task was novel to the Novelty group but familiar to the Control group. 
The iVR task was followed by immediate recall for 5 min and the “Igroup” presence 
questionnaire (Schubert, Friedmann, & Regenbrecht, 2001). On day 3, participants 
were asked to complete the memory task online during which they completed a 
remember/know/new recognition task (see Panel D). Panel B Screenshot of virtual 
kitchen of the iVR task with objects present as seen by the participants. Panel C 
Illustration of encoding task. A trial of the encoding task started with the 
presentation of a fixation cross (500 msec) followed by the presentation of a word 
(300 msec) along with reminder of current task: either deep (inanimate/animate) or 
(non-alphabetical/alphabetical). Participants had 4.5 sec to respond. This task had 
4 blocks following an ABBA design, with A/B referring to the task. The task and 
stimuli were taken from Otten et al. (2001). Panel D Illustration of recognition 
memory task. A trial of recognition task started with a fixation cross (500 msec) 
followed by the presentation of the word (1000 msec) alongside a task reminder 
(remember/familiar/new) that stayed on screen until a response of given. 
During the study phase, a trial started with a fixation cross displayed for 500 msec 
followed by the presentation of a word for 300 msec alongside a reminder of the current 
task (alphabetical vs animate). The tasks were based on Otten et al. (2001): In the 
alphabetical (shallow) tasks, participants decided whether or not the first and the last letter 
of a word are in alphabetical order, while in the animate (deep) task, they decided whether 
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or not the presented word refers to an animate object. Participants were instructed to use 
one finger from each hand to press one key for non-alphabetical/inanimate words and 
another for alphabetical/animate words. The reminder remained on the screen for 4.5 sec 
comparable to Otten et al, after which the next trial started. A failure to respond in that 
time frame led the trial being scored as no response. The encoding task was divided into 
four blocks of 72 words, with each block having one of the two tasks. The order of words 
within a block was randomised once and then was the same for every participant. 
Participants were not be told that their memory for the words were later be tested; rather, 
they were told that their ratings of the words would simply help prepare the stimuli for 
another experiment on different participants.  
After the study phase, participants of both groups (Novelty and Control group) 
immediately spent approximately 25 minutes in the iVR task from Chapter 2 Experiment 
3b. Assignment of participants to groups alternated according to availability. The iVR 
task consisted of an encoding phase, in which participants have 45 sec to explore a virtual 
kitchen and memorise the locations of 20 everyday items (e.g. microwave, helmet etc.; 
see Figure 3.1B). After this, participants were taught how to pick up objects in this VE 
and then asked to pick up and place each of the twenty objects that they had seen earlier 
at the locations that they had to remember. After completing this, participants removed 
the VR headset and completed a 3AFC recognition memory task, in which participants 
had to choose the correct object location out of three alternatives, and a rating task, in 
which participants rated how expected the locations and objects were. More information 
on the nature of the iVR task can be found in Open Science Framework pre-registration 
form: https://osf.io/4sw2t/. The visuospatial nature of the iVR task (i.e. remembering 
object locations) was sufficiently different from memorising single words that we did not 
expect interference between the tasks (Wixted, 2004).  
After the iVR task, participants were asked to recall as many words as they can 
(immediate recall) for 5 minutes. Participants were asked to write down the words that 
they remember on a piece of paper. After this, participants completed the Igroup Presence 
Questionnaire (IPQ; Schubert et al., 2001) to assess involvement, presence and realism 
of the iVR experience (http://www.igroup.org/pq/ipq/items.php). In a computerised 
adaptation of this questionnaire, participants gave their ratings on a slider scale using the 
original questions and anchors.  
The next day, participants were asked to complete a recognition memory task similar to 
the one used by Fenker et al. (2008), in which the participants were presented with the 
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words they studied previously, intermixed randomly with 144 non-studied words. A trial 
in this task started with a fixation cross displayed for 500 msec followed by the 
presentation of the word for 1000 msec. Participants were instructed to press the ‘n’ key 
if they think the word was new, the ‘f’ key if the word was familiar and the ‘r’ key if they 
remembered the word. Note that I preferred to use the word “familiar” when instructing 
participants because they typically found it easier to understand than the word “know”. 
The exact instructions were based on those used by Bastin et al. (2010), though 
conceptually my results were comparable to previous studies using Tulving’s original 
“know” instruction, which is why I continued to use the words Remember and Know in 
analyses below. At the end of the online session, participants were completely debriefed 
and compensated. 
Stimuli 
The same number of words (144 per task, i.e. 288 total) were used in the study phase as 
in Otten et al (2001), though only half of the number of unstudied words (144) were used 
in the test phase, since unstudied words were not of primary interest here. Thus a subset 
of 432 words from Otten et al (2001), balanced according to study response category 
(animate/inanimate and alphabetical/non-alphabetical), had been split into 3 sets of 144 
words and the assignment of words to the two study conditions and the unstudied 
condition were counterbalanced across participants (6 different combinations in total). 
The lists had been selected so as not to differ in terms of the characteristics available in 
the MRC Psycholinguistic Database (see here for selection and list creation process; for 
words see Wilson, 1988).  
For the iVR task, the following stimuli will be used: the virtual kitchen has been created 
using SketchUp (https://www.sketchup.com/), unity3d (https://unity3d.com/) and freely 
available 3D models downloaded from https://archive3d.net. In addition to typical kitchen 
furniture such chairs and a table, this kitchen contains 20 everyday objects such a hat, a 
calendar and a toy (for an illustration of the virtual environment see Figure 3.1B).  
Equipment 
At the beginning, the VE was presented with an HTC VIVE VR system and run on MSI 
VR ONE 7RE-057UK computer with Intel Core i7-7820HK, 16GB RAM and GeForce 
GTX 1070, which can be worn as backpack allowing free movement. Due to equipment 
failure I had to replace the VR computer and started to use a Dell Desktop PC (Precision 
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5820 Tower X-Series) with Intel Core i9-10900 and GeForce RTX 2080 midway through 
data collection. To allow free movement, I used the VIVE Wireless Adapter.  
Other laboratory tasks were completed on a Dell Latitude E6530 laptop. For these tasks, 
stimuli were presented with Matlab (https://www.mathworks.com) using the 
Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997). The 
online tasks were run on a JATOS (Lange et al., 2015) server hosted on the MRC-CBU 
servers, which were compliant with data protection and security policies. That task was 
programmed in Javascript with jsPsych (de Leeuw, 2015).  
Statistical design and hypotheses 
To address the hypotheses outlined in the Introduction, I ran Bayesian t-tests (Morey & 
Rouder, 2018) using the package BayesFactor (version 0.9.12-4.2) for both recall and 
recognition tasks, with factors novelty (Novelty vs Control group, between-participants), 
encoding task (shallow vs deep, within-participant) and, for the recognition task, memory 
quality (probability of recollection vs familiarity, within-participants). The hypotheses 
were tested using BFs, for the alternative versus the point-null hypothesis, calculated for 
t-tests using the default scale parameter of √2/2. I used between-participant t-tests to test 
for the presence of main effects and interactions, given my directional predictions (note 
that, in factorial designs, within-participant factors with only two levels can be reduced 
to difference scores, enabling all interactions in the present design to be reduced to t-tests 
between the two groups on these difference scores; likewise, main effects can be reduced 
to t-tests between the two levels of one factor by aggregating across the other factors). 
Using t-tests for planned comparisons, instead of more the traditional ANOVA approach, 
enables me to accurately express my statistical hypotheses that are directed in some cases. 
Specifically, I predicted a main effect of novelty in recall (Hypothesis 1.1) and 
recognition memory (Hypothesis 1.2), with better memory in the Novelty group; an 
interaction between novelty and encoding task in recall (Hypothesis 2.1) and recognition 
(Hypothesis 2.2), with a larger novelty effect predicted for words that are shallowly 
encoded; an interaction between novelty and memory quality in recognition memory (3), 
with different probabilities of recollection and familiarity in the novelty versus control 
group; and the three-way interaction between novelty, encoding task and memory quality 
in recognition memory (4), with different probabilities of recollection and familiarity 
restricted to the shallowly encoded words in the novelty group. Note that the first two 
planned comparisons are one-tailed, while the last two are two-tailed. The directional 
Chapter 3: Effect of novelty 
Jörn Alexander Quent - November 2021   61 
predictions are explained in the Introduction, and I argue that directional hypotheses were 
justified because, according to BTT, null effects would be equivalent to negative effects 
and would lead to the same conclusions. In other words, that novelty could impair 
memory is not interesting theoretically to me other than that it will provide evidence 
against the BTT. This is not necessarily true for the two last comparisons because, as 
explained in the Introduction, different boundary conditions of BTT predict that novelty 
either boosts familiarity or boosts recollection. 
For the recall data, the dependent variable was the number of studied words recalled. For 
the recognition memory data, I used a multinomial processing tree (MPT) model that is 
analogous to the “Source-Item” model in Cooper, Greve and Henson (2017), which 
assumes two underlying processes contributing to memory: the probability of recollection 
(r) and the probability of familiarity (f) (see Figure 3.2). In this model, recollection and 
familiarity are discrete states and recollection is always accompanied by familiarity. 
Additional parameters that are estimated but not subject to statistical test in my model are 
gr and gk, which are the probabilities that a guessing response leads to a Remember and 
Know response, respectively. Estimating these parameters effectively adjusts the 
estimates of recollection and familiarity by their false alarm rates. The MPT will be fit 
using the “MPTinR” package (version 1.11.0; Singmann & Kellen, 2013). For statistical 
analysis of the resulting parameters, probabilities were submitted to an arcsine 
transformation so that their values approximately follow a normal distribution and are not 
bound between 0 and 1. Note that I neglected to mention in my registration of this 
experiment the following: For comparisons that do not distinguish between recollection 
and familiarity I used Pr (hit – false alarm rate) instead of averaging recollection and 
familiarity. 
In terms of choosing participant numbers, I ran a “fixed N” Bayesian analysis 
(Schönbrodt & Wagenmakers, 2018) for the hypotheses above. I based my sample size 
estimation on simulating a general linear model (GLM) with effect sizes similar to those 
reported in previous studies for a main effect of novelty. Based on the reported statistics, 
I calculated Cohen’s d for four effects that in the literature. For Fenker et al. (2008) the 
effect size is d = 0.588 for immediate remember, d = 0.943 immediate recall and d = 0.894 
for delayed remember. For Schomaker et al. (2014), the effect size for immediate recall 
is d = 0.873. My simulations based on the median (d = 0.884) showed that 36 participants 
per group is sufficient to provide compelling evidence (BF10 > 6) for one-tailed 
comparisons (1 and 2) with a probability of approximately 91%, and for two-tailed 
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comparisons (3 and 4) with a probability of approximately 83%. At the same time, I would 
be able to provide compelling evidence (BF10 < 1/6) for the null hypothesis for the 
absence of an effect in 30% of the cases for one-tailed comparisons, while the probability 
of obtaining compelling misleading evidence would be extremely low for all comparisons 
ranging between 0 and 0.09% (see here for whole design analysis).  
 
3.3 Results 
Note in the text I report accuracy rates and probability estimates, while the statistical tests 
and effect size estimates are based on arcsine transformed values, where necessary. 
Encoding task 
There was no compelling evidence that accuracy in the animacy condition, M = 0.884 
(SD = 0.0864), was different from accuracy in the alphabetical condition, M = 0.897 (SD 
= 0.101), 𝐵𝐹01 = 2.51, d = 0.183. 
Figure 3.2: Illustration of multinomial processing tree (MPT): The model illustrated 
assumes two underlying processes contributing to memory. The tree at the top captures 
responses to studied words, while the tree at the bottom captures responses to new 
(unstudied) words. Possible responses in the remember/know/new task are R, K and N, 
respectively. In response to studied words, R and K are categorised as hits, while N 
responses are misses. In response to new words, R and K are categorised as false alarms 
(FA) and N as correct rejections (CR). Estimated MPT parameters are: r = probability of 
recollection, f = probability of familiarity, gr = probability of a guessing responses that 
leads to an R response, gk = probability of a guessing responses that leads to a K response. 
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However, as expected, responses were faster in the animacy condition, M = 1000 msec 
(SD = 227 msec), compared to the alphabetical condition, M = 1540 msec (SD = 351 
msec), 𝐵𝐹10 = 2.51e+21, d = 1.88 (therefore any better retrieval in the animacy condition 
is unlikely to simply reflect a longer time spent studying).  
Memory tasks 
Despite not explicitly registering in Stage 1, I first report the “levels of processing” effect 
in order to confirm that this manipulation had the desired effect of producing greater 
memory for deeply- than shallowly-encoded words. For the immediate recall, participants 
recalled more words in the animacy condition, M = 15.4 (SD = 6.38), than in the 
alphabetical condition, M = 2.77 (SD = 2.85), 𝐵𝐹10 = 8.05e+27, d = 1.91. Thus my level 
of processing manipulation had the intended effect. Full results for recall and recognition 
task can be found in Figure 3.3.  
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Figure 3.3: Main results for recall and recognition: Panel A Number of words 
recalled as a function of the encoding task alphabetical/non-alphabetical and 
animate/inanimate for the Novelty group (brown) and the Control group (blue). 
Panel B Arcsine transformed probability estimates from the MTP analysis of the 
recognition task. Estimates for familiarity (left) and recollection (right) are 
displayed as function of encoding task for the Novelty and the Control group. 
Boxplots with triangles illustrating the mean.  
For registered Hypothesis 1.1 (Figure 3.4A), the immediate recall tests provided evidence 
that participants in the Novelty group, M = 16.8 (SD = 7.02) did not recall more words 
than participants in the Control group, M = 19.4 (SD = 7.59), i.e., moderate evidence for 
the null hypothesis, 𝐵𝐹01 = 9.2, d = 0.35. Based on this I stopped data collection. In a 
two-tailed version of this test (not registered), evidence that the Control group actually 
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recalled more words than the Novelty group was inconclusive, 𝐵𝐹10 = 0.618, despite the 
difference in means.  
For Hypothesis 1.2 (Figure 3.4B), an overall measure of Pr for the delayed recognition 
memory test provided moderate evidence that the Novelty group, M = 0.196 (SD = 0.091), 
did not have better memory than the Control group, M = 0.22 (SD = 0.106), 𝐵𝐹01 = 7.46, 
d = 0.25. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Group difference plots: Boxplots for each hypothesis showing the values 
or difference scores that are compared with the Bayesian t-tests with triangles 
illustrating the mean. The novelty group is displayed in brown and the control group 
in blue. The y-axes for Panel E and F are short for transformed estimated 
probability.  
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For Hypothesis 2, I found inconclusive evidence that the levels of processing effect for 
immediate recall differed between the Novelty group, M = 11.4 (SD = 7.71), and Control 
group, M = 13.7 (SD = 5.1), 𝐵𝐹10 = 1.17, d = 0.356 (Hypothesis 2.1; Figure 3.4C), as that 
it differed for delayed recognition between the Novelty group, M = 0.162 (SD = 0.108), 
and the Control group, M = 0.205 (SD = 0.125), 𝐵𝐹10 = 1.29, d = 0.371 (Hypothesis 2.2; 
Figure 3.4D). 
For Hypothesis 3 (Figure 3.4E), I found inconclusive evidence (two-tailed) of a difference 
in recollection versus familiarity during delayed recognition (i.e., difference in the “r” 
and “f” parameters from the MPT, collapsed across two encoding conditions) between 
the Novelty group, M = -0.0509 (SD = 0.152), and Control group, M = -0.024 (SD = 
0.164), 𝐵𝐹10 = 0.385, d = 0.244. 
To test for the interaction of Hypothesis 4 (Figure 3.4F), I first calculated the difference 
between the two encoding conditions (deep versus shallow) for each MPT parameter (r 
versus f), then subtracted these difference scores and compared them across groups. 
Again, there was inconclusive evidence for any difference between the Novelty group, M 
= -0.0162 (SD = 0.195), and the Control group, M = -0.0715 (SD = 0.186), 𝐵𝐹10 = 0.486, 
d = 0.3. Table 3.1 shows a summary of BF for each Hypothesis. 
 
Table 3.1: A summary of the results of the six registered hypotheses. 
Hypothesis Description BF10 BF01 
1.1 Main effect of novelty in immediate recall 0.109 9.200 
1.2 Main effect of novelty in delayed recognition  0.134 7.460 
2.1 Interaction between novelty and encoding task in recall 1.170 0.855 
2.2 Interaction between novelty and encoding task in 
recognition 
1.290 0.774 
3 Interaction between novelty and memory quality in 
recognition  
0.385 2.600 
4 Three-way interaction between novelty, encoding task 
and memory quality in recognition  
0.486 2.060 
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Post VR questionnaire 
As an additional non-registered analysis, I examined the data from the post VR 
questionnaire that I collected. For this, the data was rescaled to vary from 0 to 6, as in the 
original scale (Schubert et al., 2001), with inverse items reversed7. The IPQ score was 
then calculated by summing across all items (similar to Schomaker et al., 2014, as 
confirmed by personal communication). This analysis showed that the Novelty group, M 
= 51.8 (SD = 10.9), did not differ from the Control group, M = 52 (SD = 10.1), d = 0.0238, 
BF10 = 0.246 (Figure 3.5A). In addition, I asked participants to rate the statements: “This 
experience was novel”, “This experience was exciting” and “This experience was 
uncomfortable”. However group differences did not arise for any of these statements: 
most surprisingly for Statement 1, concerning subjective rating of novelty, there was 
anecdotal evidence against the Novelty group, M = 5.28 (SD = 0.957), finding the iVR 
experience more novel than the Control group, M = 5.18 (SD = 1.34), d = 0.049, BF10 = 
0.249 (Figure 3.5B). Note to deal with the negative skew for Statement 1, data were scaled 
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3.4 Discussion 
This study found no evidence that a novel experience can retroactively enhance memory 
for material that had been learned prior to that experience. For the novel experience, I 
used people’s first experience of an iVR environment (compared to other people’s second 
experience); for the material to be remembered, I used a list of unrelated words, which 
were studied under incidental tasks of either animate/inanimate judgment (deep encoding) 
or alphabetical judgment (shallow encoding). BFs showed moderate evidence that 
memory was not enhanced for same-day recall of the words (immediately after the iVR 
experience), and moderate evidence for no effect on recognition memory tested the next 
day. I also found no evidence (either way) for my additional hypotheses that any novelty-
Figure 3.5: Boxplots for questionnaire data, with triangles showing the 
mean. The novelty group is displayed in brown and the control group 
in blue.  
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related boost would be greater for shallowly- than deeply-encoded words, and would 
differ for words later recollected versus familiar in the delayed recognition test.  
The lack of any effects is surprising because previous studies did find that experiencing 
a novel VE versus a familiar one can boost memory for words learned after the VE 
experience (Schomaker et al., 2014, 2021). One reason could be that this type of novelty 
only has proactive effects on memory for this type of material, and no retroactive effects. 
However, this is contrary to animal studies that tend to find both proactive and retroactive 
effects (but with different memory tasks; see Section 3.1 of Chapter 1) and the BTT 
derived from these animal data. 
Another possibility is that my comparison of first versus second experience of iVR did 
not differ sufficiently in terms of novelty. This might explain why there was no evidence 
for a difference between my two groups in their mean rating of novelty (or any other 
aspect of their experience) in my post-experiment questionnaire, though the lack of 
difference in subjective ratings of novelty could be obscured by a ceiling effect. I chose 
this comparison of first versus second experience of a VE because it was tightly 
controlled, compared for example to comparing an iVR experience to a more familiar, 
non-iVR experience, which could differ in ways other than novelty, and because a similar 
comparison was used by Schomaker et al. (2014; 2021). In fact, Schomaker et al. 
compared a novel VE with a familiar VE, for participants who were generally familiar 
with the technology, which if anything would seem a less extreme contrast in novelty 
than my comparison of participants’ first ever experience of iVR: i.e. my groups differed 
in their familiarity for both the VE (my virtual kitchen) and the iVR technology (since I 
excluded participants with previous iVR experience).  The claim that my comparison was 
not novel enough also seems to conflict with previous human studies that have simply 
used familiar versus novel static images on a computer screen (e.g., Fenker et al., 2008).  
The lack of a difference between groups in the score given on my post-experiment novelty 
question could also have other reasons. Foremost, participants in the two groups may 
have used different references for their novelty rating (despite experiencing different 
levels of absolute novelty), e.g., participants in the Control group might have rated the 
novelty of their second iVR experience relative to other experiences that day (Day 2), 
rather than explicitly refer back to their first iVR experience on the previous day (Day 1); 
or they may have misunderstood the question, and rated their novelty for the overall 
experiment over the two days. It is also worth noting that most previous studies did not 
report subjective experiences of novelty for their manipulations. Schomaker et al (2014) 
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used the Igroup IPQ questionnaire (Schubert et al., 2001), which is commonly used to 
measure presence, involvement and realism in VR experiments but not novelty per se. 
While presence ratings were higher in Schomaker et al (2014) after being in a novel versus 
a familiar VE, no difference as a function of novelty was found in Schomaker et al. (2021) 
like here.  
Another possible reason for the lack of a novelty-boost on memory is that the boost was 
masked by the fact that there were differences between the Novelty and the Control group 
in terms of the difficulty of the task both groups completed between word learning and 
the memory test (i.e., count the number of objects in the kitchen, and then replace objects 
at their previous location, as part of the experiment in Chapter 2). It has been claimed that 
demanding activities can impair consolidation of memories (Dewar et al., 2007; Wixted, 
2004). Indeed, my task was likely to be easier the second time it was performed (in the 
Control group), which might have resulted in less impairment of consolidation than in the 
Novelty group, counter-acting any advantage of novelty. While this is possible, I note that 
in most situations, including in real-life, novelty is generally associated with greater 
cognitive demands (to process the novelty), so this potential confound would appear to 
apply previous demonstrations too (such as novel lessons in children’s schooling, 
Ballarini et al., 2013; Ramirez Butavand et al., 2020).  
While I could not provide evidence for behavioural tagging with my experiment, there is 
still considerable evidence that, in some situations, effects of a novel or surprising 
experience can affect memory for unrelated preceding or succeeding information, 
highlighting an important limitation of PIMMS. Memory encoding is therefore not just 
driven by PE, but also by processes that happen around it, and to understand this, 
neurobiological and computational accounts must be fused (see Chapter 5).  
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4 SETTING BOUNDARIES 
4.1 Introduction 
Besides boosting memory, surprise also plays an important role in parsing and 
segmenting our continuous experience. As discussed in Chapter 1, theories like EST or 
EHM explain how boundaries triggered by experiencing shifts that typically lead to PE 
affect memory performance in several different ways. In this chapter, I focus on the 
effects of spatial boundaries (i.e. doors) on temporal order memory.  
There is a range of studies that show that memory for the temporal order of two items is 
better when those items belong to the same event (DuBrow & Davachi, 2013, 2016; 
Ezzyat & Davachi, 2014; Heusser et al., 2018; Horner et al., 2016). For instance, DuBrow 
and Davachi (2013, Experiment 1) presented a sequence of faces or objects, with the 
category changing every few trials, allowing the authors to examine the effect of the 
changing category on temporal order memory. Associative processing was emphasised 
by instructing participants to create associations between images either through narrative 
construction or vivid mental imagery. The main way temporal order memory was 
assessed was to present pairs of items from the same category that either contained or did 
not contain a boundary between them, and asking which of the two was more recent. The 
main result was that temporal order memory was better when no switch (i.e. boundary) 
occurred.  
As already mentioned in Chapter 1, a special type of boundary is walking through a 
doorway. Horner et al. (2016) developed a spatial paradigm conceptually similar to the 
one used in DuBrow and Davachi (2013), except that participants navigated through a 
series of rooms, each of which contained two tables. Placed on those tables was an image 
of an object for which participants had to decide whether it was natural or man-made. 
This paradigm allowed the authors to investigate how temporal order memory is affected 
as a function of whether two objects appeared in the same room (within boundaries) or in 
two adjacent rooms (across boundaries). Temporal order memory was tested in slightly 
different way than is typically done (see e.g. DuBrow and Davachi, 2013), by presenting 
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a cue object and asking either “Which object came next?” or “Which object came 
before?”. Here, Horner et al. offered their participants three alternatives (i.e. a 3AFC task) 
with one correct and two incorrect response options (one seen earlier in the sequence and 
the other one seen later in the sequence). Across three experiments, temporal order 
memory was found to be better for objects within the same room vs. across two rooms. 
In order to compare the results from my experiments, I downloaded Horner’s et al.’s data 
and plotted them in Figure 4.3. The authors also tested item memory, whether the first of 
the second object of the room would be remembered differently and what they coined 
context memory (i.e. the exact room in which an object was presented). Item memory, 
though above chance, did not vary as a function of whether the object was presented first 
or second in a room, while context memory was consistently not above chance. 
Thus it appears that walking into a new room can act like a boundary in its effect on 
temporal order memory. However, it remains unclear what aspect of walking through a 
doorway is driving this and other related memory effects (e.g. the location updating effect 
of Radvansky & Copeland, 2006, described in Chapter 1). One possibility could be that 
doors are special and always serve as boundaries regardless of any other factor. However, 
walking between rooms also often results in a large perceptual change (PC). For instance, 
real world rooms typically differ in terms of their layout and what you find in them (e.g. 
a bathroom versus a living room). On the other hand, EST posits that the PE is central for 
setting boundaries (e.g. a PC may not be important if it is fully expected when walking 
between rooms). The original aim of the work in this chapter was therefore to examine 
whether PC and/or PE are responsible for the boundary effect of walking through a 
doorway in a virtual environment.  
To study effect of PC and PE, I created a (non-immersive) VR paradigm that closely 
matches the experiments described in Horner et al. (2016). To expand this paradigm, I 
designed a special “M-room” (Figure 4.1B), as distinct from the “open” or “O-rooms” 
like those used by Horner et al. (2016; a video showing the difference between O-rooms 
and M-rooms can be found here https://vimeo.com/532276947). Participants watched a 
video from the perspective of someone traversing these rooms in a fixed route 
(participants did not themselves navigate; see below). When traversing an M-room, the 
viewer can only see one half of the room until they reach the middle section, at which 
point their perspective is rotated and they see the other half of the room. The middle 
section of the M-room was kept neutral white. Approaching this neutral area is depicted 
in the first two images of Figure 4.1 Panel C. The fact that the viewer does not see the 
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whole room when they enter allows certain features of the second room half (e.g. wall 
colour or floor pattern) to be changed, i.e. to manipulate PC, in the absence of a door 
between the two parts of the room. PC, or the absence of PC, could then be cued, thereby 
manipulating PE by building up and confirming/violating the expectation of PC. For 
instance, a cue could indicate that the wall colour of the second room will change to green, 
while it actually would stay the same colour as the first half. This example would be a 
case where there is no PC but PE, but of course other combinations are possible. Memory 
for objects that straddled this PC/PE in an M-room could be compared with that in  the 
more standard “across room” condition (as well as memory in a “within room” condition, 
in which neither PC nor PE are present). If introducing PC and/or PE rendered 
performance similar to the “across room” condition, I could infer that the specific 
combinations of factors is driving the standard effect of walking through a doorway.  
 
Figure 4.1: Illustration of room layout: Panel A shows the layout of the standard O-
room. Panel B shows the layout of the M-room with arrows that illustrate the 
navigation path. The numbered triangles approximate the camera position and 
orientation of the screenshots shown below. Panel C shows a series of screenshots 
that illustrate the camera view while navigating through an M-room. Note that in 
Panel C, no PC is introduced as both halves of the room have the same wall colour. 
For further illustration, see the video (https://vimeo.com/532276947), which 
illustrates the difference between watching navigation through an M vs. O-room.  
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As a first step in this project, a pilot study was conducted to verify that crossing to the 
second half of the M-room in the absence of PC or PE does not constitute a boundary in 
itself. To this end, I tested whether the superior temporal order memory (i.e. which object 
appeared before/after a cue object, as in Horner et al. 2016; see below) for objects within 
the same room than in different rooms, is similar in M-rooms and O-rooms.  
Unfortunately, this basic effect of superior temporal order memory for objects within 
versus across rooms could not be replicated in either room type. Therefore, the planned 
manipulation of PE versus PC was not performed, and the three experiments that follow 
only demonstrate an inability to replicate the basic room-boundary effect (i.e. within > 
across), even after addressing several potential confounds. Remaining differences 
between the present experiments and those of Horner et al. (2016) are discussed, as 
fruitful avenues for future experiments.  
4.2 Experiment 1 
Method 
Procedure 
While in Horner et al. (2016) participants navigated through the VE themselves, 
participants in this series of experiments watched a video from a first-person perspective 
of someone walking through the rooms. This decision was made to ease online data 
collection (which was enforced in part by the pandemic that occurred during the third and 
fourth years of this PhD). While watching the video, participants in this task were required 
to judge whether an object was smaller or bigger than a reference (a shoebox like in 
DuBrow & Davachi, 2013) as soon as the object appeared. In this and all subsequent 
experiments, the object was visible for 3 sec. After the 3 sec, the object disappeared and 
the cardboard box re-appeared controlling the time during which the object was visible 
for the participant. Participants were instructed to press S on their keyboard if the object 
is smaller and L if the object is larger than the reference object. Key presses were recorded 
but not further analysed.  
After watching the video, participants immediately completed some memory tasks. The 
first memory task was temporal order memory, assessed by a 3AFC task. In this  task, a 
cue object was presented along with the question “What came before this object?”, or 
“What came after this object?”, depending on the counterbalance condition. Beneath the 
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cue object, three objects were presented: one correct (i.e. the target) and two foils. This 
was followed by two further memory tests in which participants were first asked to choose 
in which type of room the cue object was seen in (in-house piloting showed that people 
could not remember the exact room – in terms of wall colour and floor texture – hence 
only the type of room was tested similarly to the Horner study) and then asked on which 
of the two tables the cue object was presented (i.e. 2AFC task in both cases). In contrast 
to Horner et al., (2016), I did not use a context memory task (apart from pre-pilot where 
memory performance was not above chance either) and I also decided against 
implementing an item memory task as finding suitable 3D objects is cumbersome and no 
interesting results with this test were reported in Horner et al. (2016). Finally there was a 
short debrief questionnaire, which was mostly used to screen for technical difficulty and 
participant feedback.  
All tasks in this chapter were run online on a JATOS (Lange et al., 2015) server hosted 
on the MRC-CBU servers, which were compliant with data protection and security 
policies. That task was programmed in Javascript with jsPsych (de Leeuw, 2015). 
Virtual environment and objects 
The basic layout of both rooms (Figure 4.1) were created with SketchUp 
(https://www.sketchup.com). These were then imported into the video game development 
platform unity3d (https://unity.com/), which was used for creating the VE including the 
necessary programming, lighting and camera settings. In contrast to Horner et al., the 
layouts of all O and M-rooms were always identical including the positions of the tables, 
differing only in wall colour and floor material (wood or carpet textures). Like the order 
of the objects, the wall colours and floor materials were constant across the videos of the 
same counterbalance condition (see below). The number of wall colours (blue, brown, 
green, grey, orange, pink, purple, red, turquoise and yellow) and floor materials (5 
different carpets and 5 different wood floors) allowed me to construct 45 unique rooms. 
Both types of rooms contained three tables; however only two were used in the 
experiments discussed here (the remaining table was for a possible future version). 
88 everyday objects were downloaded (e.g. guitar, toys, household items etc.) from 
archive3d (https://archive3d.net/) and edited either in blender (https://www.blender.org/) 
or in unity3d itself. I tried to find as many 3D versions of objects as possible that were 
also used in Horner et al. (2016). The objects were presented at realistic scales (i.e., an 
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object that is small in reality was also small in the virtual environment) to avoid any PE 
stemming from unrealistic object sizes.  
Videos were simply created by capturing the screen while I navigated through the series 
of room using keyboard and mouse controls. Different conditions entailed different 
videos. Great care was taken to minimise any difference between the videos, though it is 
possible that some differences existed.  
Counterbalancing 
In Experiment 1, M and O-rooms alternated so that each participant saw the both types 
of rooms. Four videos were created where the order of the objects presented was the same, 
but two factors were counter-balanced: a) whether the first association between objects 
was across vs. within rooms and, b) whether the first room the participants encountered 
was an O or an M-room. Thus, two videos (Video 1 and 2) were created where two objects 
were presented in the first room (so the first object-object association was within-room), 
while in the other two (Video 3 and 4), the first room only showed one object (so the first 
object-object association was across-rooms). To control any influence of which room type 
(O or M), the first room in Video 1 and 3 was an M-room, while the first room in Video 
2 and 4 was an O-room. An additional between-subject condition was the direction of the 
temporal order question (before vs. after), producing a total of eight counter-balance 
conditions (which were not analysed).  
Foil selection and trial design 
In order to implement tighter control of the foils’ temporal position than it was done in 
Horner et al. (2016), where the foils were selected randomly (e.g., some could have come 
from the start or end of the experiment), foil 1 was the object that was presented four 
positions before the target object and foil 2 was the object that was presented four 
positions after the target (see Figure 4.2). The foils were therefore presented in the same 
room type and on the same table as the target object. 
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of foils selection in Experiment 1a and 1b: The cue object 
(blue star) is followed by the probe (yellow star). Foil 1 (red star) and foil 2 (green 
star) are found three/four positions away from the probe but are in the same room 
type and on the same table as the probe. Illustrated here is the forward question.  
Each object only served as cue once. Due to the availability of suitable foils, the number 
of associations tested was lower than the total number of objects presented in the videos. 
For across-room associations there were 49 trials. Dependent on the counterbalance 
condition, there were either 19 trials for within-M-room associations and 20 trials for 
within-O-room associations, or the other way around.  
Experiment 1a  
Sample 
In this first “pilot” experiment, 10 participants (6 female and 4 male) were tested through 
Prolific (even though not fully counterbalanced), with mean age M = 33.3 (SD = 9.24) 
years. In this and all other experiments, participants using mobile devices were not able 
to participate to make sure that they used a laptop or desktop PC.  
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Statistical analysis 
Bayesian t-tests were used to compare mean differences. To this end, ttestBF() from the 
BayesFactor package (Morey & Rouder, 2018; version 0.9.12-4.2) was used8. In addition, 
Bayesian ANOVAs were calculate with anovaBF(). The parameter rscale was set to the 
default value of √2/2 or t-tests and 1/2 for ANOVAs. Based on previous work (e.g. 
Horner et al., 2016), it was expected that performance in the “within” boundary condition 
would be better than in the “across” boundary condition (i.e. higher proportion of correct 
responses). Therefore, directed (i.e. one-sided) tests were used where applicable (for 
instance tests against chance were one-sided). Proportion correct data were arcsine-
transformed to create more normally-distributed data for analysis but original values are 
reported in the text.  
Note that, because of the alternation of the two types of room, the preceding room in the 
“across” room condition was always of the opposite type to the room containing the cue 
object. Nonetheless, a trial could be classified as an O-room or M-room depending on 
which room the cue object was in. The data were therefore analysed as a 2 x 2 factorial 
design with: “room-type” (O or M) and “boundary” (i.e., within same room vs between 
previous/subsequent room of opposite type). 




The results for the test of temporal order memory for each condition are shown in Figure 




8 One might ask why I did not use a similar sequential analysis as I did in Chapter 2 and propagated the 
evidence. With brms, propagation of evidence is only suitable if I had used the same model for essentially 
the same task as was the case in Chapter 2. Even within Experiment 1, where the task structure is very 
similar, it can be argued that with chance performance in Experiment 1a & 1b it is problematic to combine 
these experiments with Experiment 1c that is the only experiment where performance is above chance. 
Furthermore, Experiment 2 & 3 do not share the same main model and also include important differences 
in design (blocked question type vs. two study-test cycles). For these reasons, propagation of evidence is 
not suitable way to analyse data here.  
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effect of boundary, BF01 = 3.14. There was inconclusive evidence for a main effect of 
room-type of cue, BF01 = 2.26, as well as for the interaction, BF01 = 1.49. For 
completeness, simple effects showed anecdotal evidence against a boundary effect for 
either M-rooms, BF01 = 3.11, d = -0.0179, and inconclusive evidence for O-rooms, BF01 
= 2.7, d = 0.0757. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Data from Horner et al. (2016) and from Experiment 1a, 1b and 1c: Top 
row: The data is from Horner et al. (2016) plotted for comparison. Data were 
aggregated across the different question types where applicable. For Experiment 2 
& 3, the data are from the original analysis, not the control analysis  that tried to 
address difference in navigation time (see Horner et al., 2016 for details). Note that 
Horner et al. (2016) Experiment 1 was most similar to Experiment 1c, while 
Experiment 3 here was most similar to Experiment 3 in their paper. The colours 
green and yellow were chosen because the rooms in Horner et al. (2016) most closely 
matched O-rooms. Triangles represent condition mean. The data were accessed 
from      
https://figshare.com/articles/dataset/Excel_file_for_behavioural_data_presented_i
n_paper/1609803/3. Bottom row: Main results for Exp 1a, 1b and 1c. Standard 
Novelty, Prediction Error and Memory Encoding: Limitations of the PIMMS framework 
80  Jörn Alexander Quent - November 2021 
coloured boxplots with triangles illustrating respective condition mean for the 
interaction of room type (M-room vs. O-room) and boundary (across vs. within). 
Horizontal line indicating chance performance (1/3) for 3AFC accuracy.  
However, the lack of condition differences could be because overall performance was at 
floor. Indeed, there was moderate evidence that temporal order memory was not above 
chance (i.e., averaged across within and across conditions, BF01 = 6.75, M = 0.304 (SD = 
0.0628)).  
For the tests of source memory (Figure 4.4A), there was anecdotal evidence that 
participants could not remember in the room-type in which an object was presented, BF01 
= 5.07, M = 0.482 (SD = 0.0755). There was inconclusive evidence about whether or not 
they could remember the table on which an object was presented, BF10 = 1.29, M = 0.536 
(SD = 0.0769).  
 
 
Figure 4.4: Performance in the room & table task for Experiment 1a, 1b and 1c: 
Standard boxplots with triangles illustrating task mean. Horizontal line indicating 
chance performance (0.5) for 2AFC accuracy.  
Discussion 
Contrary to expectations, there was no boundary effect (better temporal order memory 
for within versus between rooms) for either room type: the original O-rooms like those 
used by Horner et al (2016), nor the new “M-rooms” (despite no PC between the two 
tables). This may be because temporal order memory was not above chance. One reason 
for this could be that the task instructions were ambiguous, in that the question “What 
came before this object?” could be interpreted in a way that participants thought that 
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either of the two objects that appeared before the cue object (i.e. the target as well as the 
earlier foil) would be a valid answer. Therefore, in Experiment 1b, the instruction was 
changed.  
Experiment 1b 
Experiment 1b was identical to 1a apart from the temporal order task instructions: 
Participants were now asked “In the video you just watched, which one of the three 
objects at the bottom of the screen appeared immediately after this object?” in order to 
make sure that there was no misunderstanding about which was the correct object (and 
also only the “after” direction of the temporal order question was tested).  
Sample 
In total, 12 participants, recruited through Prolific (five female and seven male), 
completed this version of the experiment, with mean age of M = 32.8 (SD = 11.0) years.  
Results 
The 2 x 2 ANOVA on temporal order showed anecdotal evidence against a main effect 
of boundary, BF01 = 3.11, inconclusive evidence against a main effect of room type, BF01 
= 1.27, and anecdotal evidence against an interaction, BF01 = 3.06 (see Figure 4.3E). No 
boundary effect was found for M-rooms for accuracy, across, BF01 = 1.59, d = 0.256, and 
for O-rooms for accuracy, BF01 = 2.52, d = 0.117. However, there was also inconclusive 
evidence that overall performance was above chance, BF01 = 2.23, M = 0.351 (SD = 
0.104). 
For source memory (Figure 4.4B), there was inconclusive evidence that memory for the 
room-type of the cue object was above chance, BF01 = 2.33, M = 0.509 (SD = 0.06), but 
(unlike Experiment 1a), there was now moderate evidence that participants could 
remember on which table type a cue object was presented, BF10 = 7.16, M = 0.589 (SD = 
0.11).  
Discussion 
Temporal order memory was still not above chance, suggesting that the previous 
instructions were not a problem. However, this chance-level performance might also be 
why there was no evidence for a boundary effect on memory. Once possible reason for 
such poor performance could be that the foils were very close (in time) to the target, 
whereas the random selection of foils in Horner et al. (2016) would tend to include foils 
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that were much further away in time, rendering the task easier (other possible differences 
between the studies are considered in the Discussion). 
Experiment 1c 
Experiment 1c used the same (random) foil selection procedure as Horner et al (2016), 
with the hope that this would improve memory performance. The foils here are selected 
randomly apart from three rules: First, foils could not be in the same room with target. 
Second, foils could not be from adjacent rooms. Third, foils could be repeatedly sampled. 
As a result, dependent on the counterbalance condition, the average distance between the 
Target and Foil 1 was either -24.2 or -21.4 intervening objects, and the average distance 
between the Target and Foil 2 was either 21.3 or 25.2 (c.f. the distance of 4 used in 
Experiments 1a-1b).  
Sample 
Due to technical problems, some Prolific submissions were not usable. Unfortunately, the 
data containing the Prolific IDs were deleted so that it not possible to retrieve the 
demographical data for the final sample of 13 participants. However, these came from a 
population of 31 (10 female and 21 male), with mean age of M = 30.6 (SD = 7.97) years, 
who clicked on the task. Of those, majority of those immediately aborted the task for 
unknown reasons.  
Results 
This time, there was strong evidence that overall temporal order memory was above 
chance, BF10 = 24.5, M = 0.41 (SD = 0.0778); see Figure 4.3F. However, the 2 x 2 





9 Based on the knowledge of classical statistics, one might expect the BF for the main effect in the ANOVA 
(BF10 = 1.78) should be similar to the BF that was calculated for the t-test where the data were collapsed 
across room type (BF10 = 6.77). However, models in the BayesFactor package are linked through the 
estimated value of the error variance (personal communication with Richard Morey; also see Rouder et al., 
2012). This means that the factors are not independent in the same way that is the case in a classical 
ANOVA. I therefore also reported the t-test as only this fully ignores the effect of room type.   
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There was anecdotal evidence against a main effect of room type, BF01 = 3.94, and no 
evidence for an interaction, BF01 = 1.47. 
Interestingly, the difference between condition (across vs. within) collapsed across room 
type was large, across: M = 0.369 (SD = 0.0962), within: M = 0.452 (SD = 0.0847), BF10 
= 6.77, d = 0.876. However, despite the lack of evidence for an interaction, a boundary 
effect was found for M-rooms [across: M = 0.369 (SD = 0.0962), within: M = 0.501 (SD 
= 0.132), BF10 = 7.69, d = 0.774], even if none was found for O-rooms, across [M = 0.369 
(SD = 0.0962), within: M = 0.404 (SD = 0.119), BF01 = 0.754, d = 0.43].  
In terms of source memory (Figure 4.4C), there was inconclusive evidence of above-
chance performance for remembering in which room type a cue object was presented, 
BF01 = 2.15, M = 0.51 (SD = 0.0583), but there was strong evidence (similar to 
Experiment 1b) that participants could remember on which table type a cue object was 
presented, BF10 = 19.3, M = 0.621 (SD = 0.128).  
Discussion 
Relaxing the selection of foils did have the intended effect of improving overall memory 
performance for temporal order. Surprisingly however, a boundary effect was only found 
for M-rooms; not O-rooms. Above-chance memory performance for the temporal order 
(and the table question) suggests the lack of a boundary effect does not simply owe to 
reduced participant engagement, though it is possible that higher overall levels of 
performance (more comparable to Horner et al, 2016) are needed to detect a boundary 
effect. 
The result is disappointing because the purpose of Experiment 1 was to ascertain that 
walking through the middle of an M-room does not have the same boundary effect that 
was reported in Horner et al. (2016) for walking through doors with ‘normal’ (O) rooms 
(despite the fact that the boundary effect was numerically larger in the M-room). One 
possibility is that there is some type of interference caused by alternating between the two 
types of room, so in Experiment 2, room-type was manipulated between participants 
rather than alternating. 
4.3 Experiment 2 
Relative to Experiment 1, the most important change was that room-type was now a 
between-participant factor rather than alternating within the same video. Furthermore, 
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participants were asked both directions of temporal order (before vs. after) in blocks 
instead of just one (before). 
Within each room-type, the first inter-item connection (within vs. across) and the 
direction of temporal order memory tested first (before vs. after) were counterbalanced 
across every fourth participant. To prevent the experiment from getting too long, the 
previous room-type and table-type questions were dropped, because there was sufficient 
evidence from Experiments 1a-1c that participants could only remember the table on 
which an object was placed. Memory for the table was even present when temporal order 
memory was barely above chance indicating that participants tried to perform well even 
in Experiment 1a & 1b.  
Small changes were made to the lighting in the rooms, to render them more realistic. 
Furthermore, camera movement was now scripted instead of generated by recording the 
screen while I navigated through the rooms. This eliminated any remaining between-
video differences. As a consequence, the time it took to move between the object-viewing 
positions within a room versus between rooms was further minimised (approximately 7.8 
vs 7.9 sec respectively). Other changes were that some objects were edited (colour and 
size) and some were entirely swapped because the debriefing questionnaire indicated that 
those were difficult to recognise.  
Other procedural details including the foil selection were the same as in Experiment 1c. 
Due the availability of foils, the number of trials per counterbalance condition was either 
80 and 82 for each question type (i.e. 160 and 164 in total).  
Sequential data collection 
While Experiments 1a-1c were pilots, Experiment 2 aimed to be properly powered. Since 
Experiment 1c showed a boundary effect for M-rooms but not for O-rooms, finding a 
boundary effect for O-rooms was the focus for Experiment 2. Data were collected 




10 The plan was not formally pre-registered but agreed upon among the collaborators. 
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At first, 12 participants were run for the O-room, after which the evidence was checked 
for whether there was a difference between across and within room associations. The 
sample size was then increased by increments of 4 until either a 𝐵𝐹10 of 6 or 1/6 was 
reached, or the maximum sample size of 36 was reached, based on the remaining balance 
on the Prolific account at that time (£431.66). If evidence was found for a boundary effect 
for O-rooms, the procedure would be repeated for M-rooms (starting at twelve and 
incrementing by four) with the same stopping rule (i.e., subject to remaining Prolific 
balance).  
The test determining the termination of the sequential design was a paired t-test between 
within and across room associations for each room-type. This analysis was collapsed 
across question-type, but restricted to the first block because of the possibility that the 
second block would not yield an effect due to interference from the first block. 
In order to assess whether this data collection plan had enough chance to provide 
conclusive (moderate) evidence (𝐵𝐹10 > 6 | < 1/6), a simplified simulation was ran with 
directional Bayesian t-tests with minimum sample size of 12 and maximum of 36 with 
effect sizes d = 0, 0.44 and 0.78 that correspond to a null effect, the effect size for O-
rooms and the effect size for M-rooms, respectively, that were observed in Experiment 
1c (see Figure 4.5). 
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Figure 4.5: Results of design analysis for a Bayesian sequential design: Panel A, B 
and C show the results of the design analysis for true effect sizes of d = 0.00, d = 0.44 
and d = 0.78 respectively. D shows the rainbow colour legend for BF10. Each line in 
the centre graphic illustrates one simulation of a sequential data collection run. The 
colouring is determined by the BF10 at the end of a simulation when the algorithm 
terminated either by reaching an evidence criterium (BF10 > 6 or BF10 < 1/6) or the 
maximal sample size (N = 36). Histograms at the top and the bottom show the 
frequency with which simulation end at a particular sample size. Colouring again 
indicate the strength of the evidence. The right hand side histograms illustrate how 
many simulation ended by reaching the maximal N.  
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Table 4.1: Summary of design analysis simulation. 
 
Effect size Median sample size Evidence rate Misleading evidence rate 
d = 0.00 28 0.5833 0.0301 
d = 0.44 28 0.6321 0.0217 
d = 0.78 12 0.9863 0.0002 
 
Thus the probability of exceeding a BF01 of 6 when there is no effect, or exceeding a BF10 
of 6 when the effect size matches that for the O-rooms in Experiment 1c, is around 60% 
in both cases (with a probability of misleading evidence of 3% or less; see Table 4.1). 
Sample 
In total, 16 participants (7 female and 9 male), recruited through Prolific, completed this 
version of the experiment, before the the priori BF criteria was exceeded. Their mean age 
was M = 27.9 (SD = 10.1) years.  
Results 
Data collection terminated at N = 16, all of whom completed the O-room condition, at 
which the BF for the null exceeded the criterion that there is no boundary effect for the 
first block for accuracy with O-rooms, BF01 = 7.06, d = -0.252 (see Figure 4.6A). This 
result also held true when collapsing across both blocks [across: M = 0.398 (SD = 0.0744), 
within: M = 0.372 (SD = 0.0834), BF01 = 7.81, d = -0.308]. Overall, memory performance 
was low, but above chance, BF10 = 14.68, M = 0.385 (SD = 0.0667). 
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Figure 4.6: Main results for Experiment 2 & 3, where only O-rooms were used: 
Standard boxplots with triangles illustrating condition means. Note that for panel 
A, only data from the first block were included. Dots connected by a line belong to 
the same participant.  
 
The ANOVA with boundary-type, question-type and block did not produce strong 
evidence for main effects or interactions (all BF01 < 4.5 and > 0.593), apart for the main 
effect of question type, BF10 = 9.23, with performance for the “after” question, M = 0.416 
(SD = 0.0785), being higher than for the “before” question, M = 0.355 (SD = 0.0846).  
Discussion 
While Experiment 1c provided no clear evidence for or against a boundary effect in O-
rooms, Experiment 2 found moderate evidence against such an effect. Overall, temporal 
order memory was above chance, though it was still low. In a final attempt, Experiment 
3 tried to increase overall performance. Interestingly, like reported by Horner et al. (2016) 
performance was better in forward direction (i.e. for the “after” question) showing that 
are not just non-replicable effects.   
4.4 Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 also only tested O-rooms. Mean memory performance for these rooms in 
Experiment 2 was 0. 385 (chance = 0.333), whereas in Horner et al (2016), it was slightly 
higher, on average 0.44 across experiments. The main aim for Experiment 3 was therefore 
to further improve overall memory performance. 
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Three major changes were made to address this: a) memory encoding in Experiment 3 
was made intentional rather than incidental (participants were told at the outset that “after 
watching the video we will also test your memory performance. So, please try to 
remember the objects that you see and their order”), b) there were two study-test cycles 
(like in Horner et al., 2016, Experiment 2 & 3), so that only 44 objects at a time were 
encoded before memory was tested, and c) the rooms were made even more distinct. 
Regarding the latter case, only five different wall colours and five different floor textures 
were used in Experiments 1 and 2, which means a room was only unique by the virtue of 
combining wall colours and floor textures. To increase room distinctiveness in 
Experiment 3, each floor featured a unique texture that was selected to stand out 
(e.g. brightly coloured tiles, noticeable carpet patterns, etc.). 
The other procedural details including the foil selection were the same as in Experiment 
1c. Due to the availability of foils the number of trials per condition (e.g. within vs. 
across) was either 36 or 38 per cycle. Furthermore, I again decided to only test one 
question type (the after question) to reduce the number of counter balance conditions and 
this factor did not interact with any effect in my experiments so far and it also did not 
interact with the boundary effect in Horner et al. (2016).  
Sample 
One participant was excluded because they did not complete the whole task. In total, 49 
participants (19 female and 30 male), recruited through Prolific, completed this version 
of the experiment, with mean age of M = 29.2 (SD = 11.8) years. The sample size was 
determined by the amount of money left for this project. Since the sample size is larger 
than what was simulated in the design analysis for Experiment 2 (see Table 4.1), power 
to provide strong evidence was improved relative to that experiment.  
Results 
Average transformed (overall) accuracy was treated as an outlier if it was above/below 
two Median Absolute Deviations (i.e. MAD) around the median (see Leys et al., 2013). 
This led to the exclusion of 3 participants who were above this cut-off. Note this exclusion 
was not done in the previous experiments because their sample sizes were too small for 
accurate estimation of spread across participants, but this might also contribute to higher 
mean performance. For analysis, data from both study-test cycles were collapsed.  
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Mean accuracy did increase relative to Experiment 2, up to 0.49 (0.26), which was clearly 
above chance BF10 > 1x10
8. However, there was again anecdotal evidence against a 
boundary effect, BF01 = 5.44, d = 0.0255 (see Figure 4.6B). 
Discussion 
By increasing distinctiveness of the rooms, reducing the memory load via two study-test 
cycles and instructing participants to remember the objects and their order, Experiment 3 
succeeded in improving temporal order memory (such that it was now higher than the 
average in the Horner et al., 2016, experiments). Nonetheless, there was still evidence 
against a boundary effect on temporal order memory across O-rooms. There was 
insufficient time to perform further experiments to narrow down other possible 
differences with the original study of Horner et al. (2016), but some possible reasons are 
considered below. 
4.5 General discussion 
Across five experiments, there was either no evidence for, or evidence against, a boundary 
effect for O-rooms similar to those used by Horner et al. (2016). In Experiments 1a-1b, 
where foils for the temporal order judgment were constrained to be close in time to the 
target, overall performance was not even above chance, which prevents clear 
interpretation. However, when the foils were randomised (as in the Horner et al., 2016, 
paper), and overall performance was above chance, there was either no evidence 
(Experiment 1c) or anecdotal to moderate evidence against (Experiment 2 and 3), a 
boundary effect with O-rooms. 
Surprisingly, there was evidence for a boundary effect in M-rooms in Experiment 1c, but 
since the effect in M-rooms was predicted to be smaller, if anything, than in O-rooms, 
this finding was not pursued further. 
Potential reasons for the null effect 
There are two major differences remaining between the experiments reported in this 
chapter and the experiments reported in Horner et al. (2016). First, in the Horner et 
al. (2016) study, navigation was active, whereas here participants merely watched a video 
of someone else navigating the rooms. Second, the position of the tables and the doors in 
Horner et al. (2016) varied (such that the rooms formed a closed circle), whereas here the 
spatial layout of each room was identical (apart from being an O or M-room), which 
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meant that they formed a linear route overall. One possibility is that doors function as a 
boundary (for temporal order memory at least) only when someone is actively navigating, 
and possibly trying to remember an overall layout. Another possibility is that the different 
layouts of rooms used by Horner et al (2016) made them more distinctive.  
Following the results of a recent study (Logie & Donaldson, 2021), the idea that the lack 
of active navigation is the main culprit for the null finding is unlikely, because these 
authors reported boundary effects for passive movement. In their study, they found that 
introducing boundaries increased the total number of words learned in a VE, consistent 
with EST. However, they also found that spatial boundaries were not even necessary, 
since temporal gaps sufficed to get the memory boost.  
In a number of studies on the related location updating effect, it has been shown that when 
people walk through a door, they forget information (Lawrence & Peterson, 2016; 
McFadyen et al., 2021; Pettijohn & Radvansky, 2018a, 2018b; Radvansky et al., 2010, 
2011; Radvansky & Copeland, 2006; Seel et al., 2019; though note that McFadyen et al., 
2021, failed to replicate this effect). With such a paradigm, Pettijohn & Radvansky 
(2018a) provided direct evidence that boundaries effects are smaller for passive 
navigation but still detectable. Yet, McFadyen et al. (2021) also found a boundary effect 
(in terms of a location updating effect), but only for passive movement and when working 
memory load was high. Furthermore, passive versus active navigation can also be 
interpreted as different levels of “immersion” in a VE. Immersion was manipulated by 
Radvansky and colleagues when studying that effect (Radvansky et al., 2011). These 
researchers typically use a large screen (e.g. Radvansky & Copeland, 2006) that affords 
a high level of immersion, but the effect also held when a standard screen was used 
(Radvansky et al., 2011). Another study showed that even only mentally walking through 
a doorway produced a boundary effect (Lawrence & Peterson, 2016). All of this strongly 
suggests that the lack of active navigation, while it may reduce the effect, is not the 
primary reason why the present experiments failed to find a boundary effect.  
This leaves the possibility that the experiments described here failed to find an effect 
because they used a linear environment, where each room followed a single, straight path. 
In contrast, each study that found boundary effects of any kind (deleterious or beneficial, 
e.g., for item memory and for temporal order memory respectively) used non-linear 
environments (Horner et al., 2016; Lawrence & Peterson, 2016; Logie & Donaldson, 
2021; Pettijohn & Radvansky, 2018a, 2018b; Radvansky et al., 2010, 2011; Radvansky 
& Copeland, 2006; Seel et al., 2019). A notable case here is the study from McFadyen 
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and colleagues (2021), where the VE was highly immersive and non-linear, but each 
hexagonal room was otherwise identical (same layout and colouring etc.), which largely 
failed to replicate the location updating effect and when they did, it manifested in 
increased false alarms rate instead of the expected reduction in hit rates. All in all, it seems 
that having a complex environment with distinct rooms is a necessary condition to find 
robust boundary effects. Complex environments and distinct rooms might entail 
difference orientation responses (e.g. where is the next door) when entering a room and 
might also be more conducive to forming rooms schemas, which might affect the size of 
the boundary effect. 
Another less interesting, procedural difference was the present use of online testing rather 
than in-person testing of Horner et al (2016). However, this seems unlikely to be 
important, given that memory performance was comparable to Horner et al (2016), and 
indeed better, in the present Experiment 3.  
Despite the fact that the usefulness of item-item associations in sequential reproduction 
has been questioned (see Henson et al., 1996), when DuBrow & Davachi (2013, 
Experiment 2) de-emphasised associative processing between successive items, they 
found that they were unable to reproduce their boundary effect on temporal order memory 
(based on a 2AFC recency judgement). While a lack of item-item associations might 
account for the inability to find a boundary effect in Experiments 1 & 2, it seems less 
likely for Experiment 3, where participants where explicitly instructed to remember the 
objects they see and their order.  
In summary, the original aim elucidating which factors (PC or PE) contribute to the effect 
of spatial boundaries failed because I was unable to replicate the original finding on which 
this paradigm was based and which was supposed to serve a control condition. I therefore 
never got to use M-rooms to manipulate different types of predictions and their effects on 
temporal order memory.  
More generally, recent work suggests there might not be anything special about doors 
(Logie & Donaldson, 2021; McFadyen et al., 2021). If walking through a doorway is 
sufficient to produce boundaries effects, then these should have also manifested in my 
experiments; however it seems that this is not the case, so other factors must contribute. 
It is important to keep in mind that there was always a sizeable PC when walking into the 
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next room, and also at least some degree of PE11 in all experiments discussed in this 
chapter. Despite the presence of PC, as well as at least some PE, there was no boundary 
effect for O-rooms. It could therefore be that a boundary effect only arises when PE is 
stronger as it is possibly the case when the room layout changes, which naturally requires 




11 As participants did know what the next room would look like, there was always some PE. In Experiments 
1 and 2, the number of wall colours and floor textures was only five, so participants might have formed 
corresponding expectations, but in Experiment 3 each rooms was unique, in terms of the floor textures  and 
wall colours.  
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5 DISCUSSION 
PIMMS is a powerful framework to explain how PE drives memory encoding. It describes 
the interaction of perceptual, semantic and episodic memory systems and was originally 
crafted to explain how recollection and familiarity arise based on a predictive perspective 
on the brain. Its focus on the role of PE in memory encoding makes the model perfect to 
be applied to the literature of novelty and surprise, which is extensive but somewhat 
incoherent (Quent et al., 2021). When doing so, it helps to debunk the idea that novelty 
per se is associated with memory improvement, and provides strong grounds to 
distinguish the two concepts of novelty and surprise.  
Despite the success of PIMMS, there are several phenomena surrounding novelty, PE and 
memory encoding that are not explained by PIMMS, even though they are of high 
theoretical relevance. In my thesis, I addressed three such phenomena: 1) how memory 
encoding can be improved when information is congruent with prior knowledge (i.e., with 
little PE), forming a U-shaped function of expectancy; 2) how PIMMS is silent on 
neurobiology and therefore cannot explain phenomena like behavioural tagging that are 
believed to improve memory; and 3) how PIMMS - though it focusses on PE - is 
insufficient to explain how our continuous experience is segmented into episodes by event 
boundaries, which have important consequences for memory performance.  
5.1 U-shape between expectancy and object-location memory 
As predicted by SLIMM – a more specific neuroanatomical model developed partly in 
response to the short-comings of PIMMS – I found that there is indeed a U-shaped 
relationship between memory and expectancy, at least in the case of memory for locations 
of objects in a virtual kitchen as a function of the expectancy of those locations. This U-
shape emerged in the recall task, as well as to some extent in the 3AFC recognition task. 
Even though the evidence from the recognition task was weaker, and did not hold for the 
interrupted regression analysis, the consistent quadratic component in the recognition task 
is important because the foils controlled for the guessing bias that was found when 
participants recalled objects at expected locations. Furthermore, recollection in the 
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recognition task (as estimated for example by the proportion of remember judgments) 
clearly showed a U-shape in all analyses, including the interrupted regression. 
The U-shape for recollection was not only unpredicted according to the PIMMS 
framework, but also according to the more specific SLIMM model. SLIMM predicts that 
recollection and familiarity would play different roles for memory performance at both 
ends of the continuum, with recollection associated with memory for unexpected 
information, but familiarity associated with memory for expected information. While one 
possibility is that SLIMM is wrong, and memory for expected information is also 
associated with recollection, another possibility is that the spatial/associative nature of 
the memory probed in the experiments of Chapter 2 invariably engages recollective 
mechanisms, since recollection and spatial memory are closely related, and both rely on 
the hippocampus (see e.g. Burgess et al., 2002).  
However, other studies have shown that memory for non-spatial information can be 
associated with recollection even when congruent with expectations. For instance, Amer 
et al. (2018, 2019) presented participants with realistic and unrealistic prices of objects, 
and found that those prices that were congruent with the participants’ prior knowledge 
were associated with high confidence memory responses, which suggests that recollection 
might be involved (though see discussion in Chapter 2 about the relationship between 
confidence and recollection, since it is also possible that schema-congruent items are 
recognised with high confidence without recollection).  
Another issue that is likely to be relevant is the nature of the information recollected. 
Recollection normally refers to incidental contextual information, such as remembering 
when/where information was encountered, or what one happened to be thinking about at 
that time. It may be useful to distinguish between information that is schema-relevant 
versus schema-irrelevant (which may relate to the distinction between “intrinsic” and 
“extrinsic” context, Godden & Baddeley, 1980). Recent evidence from a VR version of 
this paradigm supports this claim by showing that the context-dependent memory effect 
was only observed for words that were related to an active schema (Shin et al., 2021). 
According to SLIMM, it is schema-irrelevant information that is not encoded for expected 
events, i.e., schema-relevant information is still encoded (while for unexpected events, all 
such concurrent information is encoded in an “episodic snapshot”; van Kesteren et al, 
2012). Thus if participants base their “remember” response on schema-relevant 
information, then such responses would be predicted to increase for expected as well as 
unexpected information. 
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The question then becomes whether the location of objects in the virtual kitchen in the 
experiments of Chapter 2, or the price of objects in the Amer et al. (2018, 2019) studies, 
are examples of schema-relevant information. For example, one could argue that the 
typical location of a kettle (in a kitchen, on a sideboard) is part of our schema for kitchens 
and kettles, in which case SLIMM predicts that location would be retrieved, and hence 
could be used to justify a “remember” response. Indeed, participants were told that 
memory for object location would be tested later. By contrast, the (relative) time at which 
a kettle was encountered while exploring a kitchen, or perhaps the colour of the kettle, 
may be irrelevant to the schema, in which case SLIMM predicts they would not to be 
encoded, provided the kettle appears where expected (whereas such details would be 
encoded as part of the episodic snapshot if the kettle were at a surprising location). 
Likewise, the typical price of objects could be considered as intrinsic to the knowledge 
(schema) for those objects, and hence explain why they were recognised with high 
confidence (and possibly frequent recollection) in Amer et al.’s studies. If this is true, 
then by re-defining (to participants) the nature of retrieved information that should be 
used for a remember response, or by testing source memory for incidental perceptual 
details like the colour of an object (if irrelevant to the schema for that object), might reveal 
a different pattern, with only an increase towards unexpected locations (no U-shape). This 
could be tested in future experiments.  
Having said this, there are other studies that suggest that the improved memory for 
expected information is accompanied by recollection even for incidental (schema-
irrelevant) details. Using congruent and incongruent (or unrelated) noun-adjective 
pairings for example, such as “yellow banana” versus “yellow strawberry” (Bein et al., 
2015; Reggev et al., 2018), Bein and colleagues (2015) reported a congruency advantage 
that was associated with increased number of remember but not of know judgements for 
target words (e.g. banana). Explaining this finding requires understanding exactly what 
type of information participants used as the basis of their remember judgments: if it were 
incidental information, then this would indeed be inconsistent with SLIMM.  
Evidence for the U-shape was weakest for accuracy in the 3AFC recognition task, so 
future work should be conducted to provide stronger evidence in this regard. A simple 
way to do this could be to present videos to participants, instead of presenting the 
environment in iVR, and collect data online for the recognition task only. This is easily 
achieved with the VR technology because the exact position and orientation of the head-
mounted display (HMD) can be tracked in the physical world and saved. The tracked 
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positions of an HMD can be then used to create videos where a real person explores the 
room freely and in a realistic fashion. This ensures that a) every participant experiences 
the room in the same way visually but also b) that objects and locations can be easily 
shuffled so that many more sets can be tested than would be practical with in-person iVR 
testing. In fact, this would also address another problem, which is because participants 
explored the kitchen freely, they sometimes missed objects because they simply did not 
explore specific parts of the room. Generalising the results across a larger set of object-
locations is especially important given the suggestion in Chapter 2 that the results might 
depend on stimulus set. Relatedly, it would also of course be interesting to generalise the 
results to other room types (e.g. a bathroom or a living room).  
The observed U-shape should also be studied as a function of various other factors like 
retention interval (e.g. one could test memory the next day, to see if consolidation 
processes moderate the effect), or participant age (e.g., if the mPFC vs MTL systems of 
SLIMM develop in children, or deteriorate in old age, at differential rates). For instance, 
it might be expected that the relative advantage for expected versus unexpected 
information might increase after a delay, as memory becomes more gist-like (or episodic 
details are forgotten), which has been repeatedly claimed (Sekeres et al., 2018; Winocur 
& Moscovitch, 2011). Similarly, slower maturation in children, or faster deterioration in 
old age, of the MTL system might similarly attenuate the advantage for unexpected 
information (e.g. Raz, 2005). Furthermore, increasing world knowledge as people get 
older might actually accentuate the U-shape, i.e., result in greater advantages for both 
expected and unexpected information, as the predictions from schema get stronger.  
Other potential uses of the iVR paradigm: effects of stress  
Another interesting future avenue could be to investigate how stress (either induced or 
via direct administration of stress hormones) affects the U-shaped relationship of 
expectancy. An important prediction of SLIMM is that different brain regions (MTL and 
mPFC) play differential roles in supporting the schema-incongruent vs schema-congruent 
advantage for memory. Manipulating stress levels might help to provide more direct 
evidence for the role of the hippocampus in the incongruent advantage.  
As a brief background, there are two receptor types that bind the stress hormones cortisol 
(humans) and corticosterone (rodents): mineralocorticoids (MR; Type I) and 
glucocorticoids (GR; Type II; Reul & de Kloet, 1985). Both receptors types can be found 
in the hippocampus. So unsurprisingly, there is consistent evidence that the hippocampus 
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is strongly affected by stress (Patel et al., 2000; Sánchez et al., 2000). Studies of the 
temporal dynamics suggest that the hippocampus’ reaction to stress first comprises 
excitation and then inhibition (Diamond et al., 2007). This pattern was confirmed by an 
fMRI study that examined the time-course of the BOLD response after hydrocortisone 
injection: hippocampal variance first increased (peaking at 5-10 min) and then decreased, 
with a peak 30-35 min post injection (Lovallo et al., 2010), which offers intriguing time-
windows during which the iVR paradigm could be completed.  
With the close relationship of stress and hippocampus in mind, it is also not surprising 
that an abundance of research has shown that stress is a potent modulator of (episodic) 
memory (Schwabe et al., 2012; Shields et al., 2017; Wolf, 2008, 2009). On the 
behavioural level, whether stress enhances or impairs memory depends on the timing 
relative to the stage of memory formation according to the “integrated” model (Schwabe 
et al., 2012; Vogel & Schwabe, 2016): stress impairs if experienced long before encoding, 
but enhances if only experienced shortly before it. On the other hand, stress before 
retrieval has a detrimental effect. These predictions were confirmed by a meta-analysis 
(Shields et al., 2017).  
To my knowledge, only two studies specifically looked at the effect of stress on schema-
related memory. The first study showed that stress and hydrocortisone can disrupt the 
benefit of prior knowledge (Kluen et al., 2017). In this study, participants learned the 
ordinal relationship of a number of galaxies on the first day and then learned two new 
hierarchies on the second day. One half of one hierarchy consisted of galaxies whose 
ordinal relationship were learned on Day 1. Hence if participants used the knowledge they 
acquired, it should give them a performance advantage. Psychosocial stress immediately 
and 25 minutes before the task on the second day, as well as hydrocortisone 45 minutes 
before the task, impaired participants’ ability to use that knowledge. Interestingly, explicit 
hierarchy recall was not impaired in participants who received hydrocortisone, which 
might suggest that the results are not due to a simple retrieval deficit.  
In the second study (Vogel et al., 2018), participants underwent a psychosocial stress test 
45 minutes before encoding schema-related and schema-unrelated words in a scanner. 
Three to five days later, participants’ memory was tested. While stress did not affect 
memory directly, participants showed better memory for schema-related words. While 
participants in the non-stressed control group showed increased activation in the mPFC 
and reduced activation in the hippocampus, participants in the stress group showed 
increased hippocampal activity during schema-related processing. This increased 
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hippocampal activity was positively related to the magnitude of the cortisol response and 
interestingly to the number of schema-related false alarms 
Both studies did not directly address the question of whether stress impacts processing of 
incongruent information more than the processing of congruent information. This 
requires at least three ordered schema-related conditions (incongruent, neutral and 
congruent) or a more continuous paradigm like that in Chapter 2. To demonstrate that the 
hippocampus is especially important for the incongruency benefit, one could administer 
hydrocortisone to participants / subject them to stress before they complete the iVR 
experiment. The timing should be arranged so that the iVR task is completed during the 
refractory period  (see Lovallo, Robinson, Glahn, & Fox, 2010), during which 
hippocampal learning is impaired, which in turn should lead to a reduced advantage for 
objects at unexpected locations. This is just one example of how the iVR paradigm I 
developed in Chapter 2 has potential for further research.  
5.2 Experiencing iVR for the first time does not improve memory 
As discussed earlier, besides not predicting a memory advantage for expected 
information, PIMMS is also silent on neurobiology. Due to this silence, PIMMS cannot 
address important aspects of how novelty and surprise relate to memory consolidation. 
One such important phenomenon is behavioural tagging, which explains how 
experiencing something novel (or significant) can boost memory for events experienced 
in close temporal proximity, due to neurochemical changes at synapses that happen 
around that time. The idea of behavioural tagging developed from the general idea of tag-
and-capture (Frey & Morris, 1997; Redondo & Morris, 2011). Evidence for this 
phenomenon comes from non-humans (Ballarini et al., 2009; Moncada & Viola, 2007) 
and humans (Ballarini et al., 2013; Fenker et al., 2008; Ramirez Butavand et al., 2020).  
In Chapter 3, I predicted that the novelty of one’s first experience of iVR (while 
performing the same tasks as in Chapter 2) would enhance memory for preceding, 
unrelated information. Contrary to my expectations, I found evidence in favour of the null 
hypothesis (i.e. iVR did not improve memory for preceding words). While I did not 
necessarily expect an effect on immediate recall, given that behavioural tagging presumes 
that a period of consolidation is needed (see for instance Roig et al., 2016), there was 
evidence against any effect for delayed recognition as well as immediate recall. This was 
at odds with previous VR studies, as reprised below. The main aims of this study were to 
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examine whether novelty would differentially affect weakly or deeply encoded 
information, and whether it would affect recollection and familiarity in different ways. 
The corresponding BFs for these hypotheses were not conclusive. At least two possible 
reasons for the lack of evidence for any effects of novelty (as discussed in Chapter 3) 
were that: a) the novelty manipulation might not have been strong enough (though this 
seems unlikely given that other reports found this effect with merely presenting unseen 
images); and b) the Control and the Novelty group differed not only in terms of 
experiencing something the first or the second time, but also in terms of the difficulty of 
the task that needed to be completed during that experience. Completing a difficult task 
after learning has been shown to negatively affect memory performance (Dewar et al., 
2007; Wixted, 2004). While counting the objects within the virtual kitchen may not be a 
difficult task, the recall and recognition tasks were reasonably demanding, so could have 
disrupted consolidation and reduced any effects of novelty on that consolidation. 
Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that novelty is often associated with increased 
cognitive demands / exploration, suggesting that it would be important for future 
experiments to factorially cross novelty with task difficulty (see Chapter 3). 
In general, evidence for behavioural tagging in humans is still scarce, with several other 
recent null findings (Biel et al., 2020; Biel & Bunzeck, 2019). Nonetheless, there is also 
recent study that did find evidence for behavioural tagging in high-school students (e.g. 
Ramirez Butavand et al., 2020), plus a further study that used familiar and novel 
Minecraft environments and found a retroactive effect, but only for ADHD patients and 
not for typically developing children/adolescents (Baumann et al., 2020). Another study 
failed to find an effect of surprising actions within video clips on memory for other actions 
that happened before (Ben-Yakov et al., 2020). While the evidence in animal studies is 
more consistent, it is worth noting that the proactive effect of VR on human memory 
reported by Schomaker and colleagues (2014, 2021) is unlikely to represent the 
behavioural tagging-like processes seen in animal experiments, because the latter is 
assumed to take time to influence memory consolidation, whereas Schomaker and 
colleagues tested memory immediately after the VR experience. 
Despite the heterogeneous state of the literature on retroactive/proactive effects of novelty 
on memory, the idea of behavioural tagging remains strong, and extends to manipulations 
other than novelty, such as manipulations of post-encoding stress (Lopes da Cunha et al., 
2018; Quent et al., 2018; Ritchey et al., 2017), fear conditioning (Dunsmoor et al., 2015; 
Hennings et al., 2021), physical exercise (Roig et al., 2013, 2016), post-encoding arousal 
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(e.g. Nielson & Arentsen, 2012) and reward (e.g. Patil et al., 2017). While there are 
several indirect demonstrations that (behavioural) tagging affects weakly-encoded 
information (Baumann et al., 2020; Lopes da Cunha et al., 2018; Quent et al., 2018)12, 
further systematic work is needed to provide direct evidence for the secondary hypotheses 
tested in Chapter 3, i.e., that tagging should benefit weak memories more than strong 
ones, and differentially affect the subsequent experience of recollection versus 
familiarity.  
In summary, as noted above, one fruitful avenue for future work would be to manipulate 
novelty in ways that are not confounded by cognitive demand (see discussion in Chapter 
3). However, the behavioural-tagging hypotheses can also be tested by using other 
manipulations like stress, arousal, physical exercise, that may be easier to de-confound 
from cognitive demand, and combined with the weak/strong encoding task that I used in 
Chapter 3. It is also important to pre-register and report such future experiments (e.g. as 
my Registered Report version of Chapter 3), just in case the positive effects in the 
literature are false positives, and many other negative results are simply not reported (and 
to get a more accurate indication of the size of any effect, e.g., for meta-analyses).  
5.3 No effect of (room) boundaries on temporal order memory 
In Chapter 4, I described a paradigm that was originally designed to study what aspects 
of walking through a doorway (perceptual change, PC, and/or prediction error, PE) leads 
to previously reported effects of boundaries (like doorways) effects on memory. 
Unfortunately, this failed because I was unable to replicate the findings of a very similar 
study (Horner et al., 2016). Chapter 4 discusses several reasons that might have led to this 
failure to replicate. One likely culprit is that the environment that I created was merely a 
chain of rooms that were arranged on a straight line, while Horner et al. used a more 




12 Note that the work from Lopes da Cunha et al. (2018) and from Baumann et al. (2020) involved groups 
of people for which weaker encoding can be assumed (ADHD patients or student group with lower memory 
in matched control group) but was not manipulated, hence this was classified as indirect evidence.  
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While a large number of studies have shown boundary effects (not only on temporal order 
memory, but also other types of memory) after walking through a doorway  (Horner et 
al., 2016; Lawrence & Peterson, 2016; Logie & Donaldson, 2021; Pettijohn & 
Radvansky, 2018a, 2018b; Radvansky et al., 2010, 2011; Radvansky & Copeland, 2006; 
Seel et al., 2019), there are also some recent suggestions that doors might not be special 
after all. For instance, Logie and Donaldson (2021) reported that temporal gaps showed 
a comparable boundary effect to walking through doors. Furthermore, a study on the 
location updating effect revealed that simply using identical rooms - instead of rooms that 
varied for example with respect to wall colours, as it is typically done - caused the 
boundary effect on item memory to vanish (McFadyen et al., 2021). It is conceivable 
rooms that are more unpredictable in terms of the layout and the interior design demand 
stronger orienting responses. Imagine you enter a room where you first have look for the 
exit versus a room that has the exact same layout and/or design as the ten previous rooms. 
It is possible that boundary effects only arise in the scenario where there is some level of 
significant unpredictability. When taken together with my results, these data suggest that 
a door per se is not the cause of boundary effects, and it is more likely that other factors 
like PC and/or PE drive these effects. Ironically, this is exactly what was planned for my 
series of experiments, but which failed because I could not find a basic effect in the 
standard condition (i.e. walking through the doorway).  
For future work, even though passive navigation is most likely not the main culprit for 
the null finding, the ease with which the experiment from Chapter 4 can be changed from 
passive to active navigation with the available code potentially warrants another attempt. 
While most studies still found a boundary effect with passive navigation, some also report 
a reduction of the effect (though see McFadyen et al., 2021). Thus counteracting this 
reduction might be sufficient to find a boundary effect for the paradigm in Chapter 4.  
Another possibility is to change the layout of the rooms. Originally, the O and M-rooms 
in Chapter 4 were created because they can be easily be placed one after the other on a 
straight line, as this made scaling the environment (i.e. adding more rooms) easier.  
Furthermore, M-rooms were designed so that if a person is anywhere within one half of 
the room, they cannot see into the other half. This was done to ensure that I could change 
the wall colour in the other half of the room without that being visible before the 
participant entered that part of the room. Nevertheless, it is possible to move the doors 
(and possibly the tables) and create a more complex environment that comes with a 
certain level of unpredictability concerning the layout of the encountered rooms. By 
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simply changing the locations of the doors and tables within both room types, it is possible 
to construct a series of rooms that is not simply a linear track. This might be more 
conducive to finding the boundary effects that Horner et al. (2016) reported.  
Even if doorways do not always serve as boundaries, the effect of boundaries on cognition 
and the brain in general are manifold (for recent reviews see Clewett et al., 2019; 
Richmond & Zacks, 2017). A myriad of studies also highlighted that other types of 
boundaries affect memory (DuBrow & Davachi, 2013, 2016; Ezzyat & Davachi, 2014; 
Heusser et al., 2018; Rouhani et al., 2020; Swallow et al., 2009). Despite the replication 
failure in Chapter 4, these effects are not fully explained by PIMMS: while PEs may cause 
event boundaries (Zacks et al., 2007), how that PE affects memory for surrounding 
information (e.g., the relative order of items that straddle versus do not straddle that PE) 
is not currently specified by PIMMS. It may be fruitful therefore to combine PIMMS with 
other event-based frameworks like EST (Reynolds et al., 2007; Zacks et al., 2007), EHM 
(Radvansky et al., 2011) - see Chapter 1 – as well as the more general Temporal Context 
Model (TCM; Norman et al., 2008; Polyn et al., 2009). Indeed, it is important for any 
general theory of memory to be able to incorporate working memory, as well as long-
term memory, as well as explain effects that are commonly attributed to a dynamic 
temporal context (e.g. see Clewett et al., 2019), including the role of consolidation 
(Yonelinas, 2019), as elaborated below.  
5.4 Further gaps in PIMMS 
Beyond the limitations that I addressed in Chapter 2 to 4, there are several other gaps that 
a comprehensive framework of (declarative) memory needs to address. I finish with 
mentioning a few of these, that are most relevant to the work in this thesis. The first of 
these, related to Chapter 2, is that, while PIMMS does consider how prior (semantic) 
knowledge interacts with the perceptual and with episodic memory system, it does not 
describe how semantic knowledge is acquired in the first place. Even if there is no 
inherent novelty benefit (see Quent et al., 2021 or Chapter 1), we are still able to learn 
truly novel information. For this, McClelland and colleagues suggested the 
“complementary learning systems” model (Kumaran et al., 2016; McClelland et al., 
1995), which provides an algorithmic model how new information is slowly acquired by 
the cortex. In that framework, acquisition of truly novel knowledge is accomplished with 
help of a fast learner that is based in the hippocampus (similar to the episodic memory 
system) and a slow learner that is based in the neocortex (similar to the semantic memory 
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system). New semantic knowledge has to be acquired by prolonged interleaved learning, 
which abstracts statistical regularities from individual episodes, for which hippocampal 
replay is supposed to play a crucial role. This kind of mechanism is lacking in PIMMS. 
PIMMS is also simplistic in terms of the brain regions that are considered. A 
comprehensive model would not only include the mPFC, as suggested by SLIMM, but 
several other regions. The locus coeruleus (LC), the substantia nigra, striatum and ventral 
tegmental area (SN/VTA) all appear to be important for novelty and memory formation 
(Clos et al., 2019; Duszkiewicz et al., 2019; Fenker et al., 2008; Guitart-Masip et al., 
2010; Hollerman & Schultz, 1998; Kamiński et al., 2018; Mikell et al., 2014; Murty et 
al., 2016; Schott et al., 2004; Wittmann et al., 2007). In relation to Chapters 2 and 3, one 
study showed, for example, that context surprise can induce early phasic responses in the 
VTA, while a second peak in the VTA could reflect a feedback signal to the hippocampus 
(Mikell et al., 2014). It has been further proposed that a functional loop exists between 
these midbrain regions and the hippocampus, via the ventral striatum (nucleus 
accumbens; Kamiński et al., 2018; Lisman & Grace, 2005 see below). These kind of 
interactions are neglected by PIMMS.  
Other studies have highlighted further brain regions, including the bilateral ventral 
striatum and bilateral putamen/insula, that track signed, reward PE (Pine et al., 2018), and 
the importance of areas like the SN/VTA for reward PE has been known for over two 
decades (Hollerman & Schultz, 1998; Schultz & Dickinson, 2000). It seems like the same 
populations of dopamine neurons that respond to reward PE may also be sensitive to 
context surprise (in the absence of an explicit reward; see Hollerman & Schulz, 1998). 
Reward anticipation (e.g. Wittmann et al., 2007) and reward PE (Ergo et al., 2020) are 
also known to affect declarative memory, yet PIMMS completely ignores reward as a 
dimension. Interestingly, the same set of regions is also believed to play a crucial role in 
event segmentation and error detection (Zacks et al., 2007). It would therefore be 
interesting to see how PIMMS can be extended when considering these phenomena and 
brain regions.  
Lastly, it has to be acknowledged that PIMMS is only a framework. However, some of 
its theoretical insights can inform a general theory of memory that not only addresses how 
the perceptual, semantic and episodic memory systems interact, but also how they relate 
to working memory. Such a theory also needs to understand perception and memory as 
ongoing processes, and not simply as snapshots. Finally, formal computational 
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implementations, informed by neurobiology, are needed to make testable, quantitative 
predictions.  
5.5 Conclusion 
The interactions between novelty, PE and memory encoding are complex. There is no 
doubt that prior knowledge has a profound influence on how we perceive the world and 
how we remember new events. However, to capture the details of this complexity, 
PIMMS needs to be developed further, to cover, for example, how new schemas are 
learned (to make predictions), how novelty and surprise can also affect neurobiological 
processes like consolidation, and how continuous stimuli are segmented for encoding into 
memory. Nonetheless, PIMMS has proved a helpful framework for thinking about some 
of these concepts, and designing experiments to demonstrate its short-comings, which is 
how science proceeds. 
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APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2  
Table 7.1: List of priors for models reported in this chapter. 
 Experiment Exp. 1 
 





Measure Predictor df µ σ df µ σ df µ σ df µ σ 
Recall 
Intercept 7 0 10 20.11 -0.95 0.42 68.3 -1.25 0.35 61.27 -0.67 0.26 
Linear 7 0 1 68.18 0.1 0.39 114.77 0.41 0.25 104.22 0.19 0.17 
Quadratic 7 0 1 63.49 1.88 0.84 118.29 1.54 0.55 132.09 1.15 0.4 
3AFC 
Intercept 7 0 10 16.92 0.91 0.37 46.04 0.68 0.27 52.23 0.72 0.2 
Linear 7 0 1 72.54 0.29 0.4 114.87 0.75 0.25 116.12 0.59 0.18 




Intercept 7 0 10 24.06 -0.48 0.29 63.4 -0.5 0.21 
Linear 7 0 1 104.49 0.29 0.26 126.96 0.03 0.17 
Quadratic 7 0 1 104.51 1.48 0.57 142.09 1.47 0.4 
Recollection  
(exclusivity) 
Intercept 7 0 10 23.45 0.37 0.37 53.29 0.35 0.25 
Linear 7 0 1 115.15 0.32 0.32 112.25 0.03 0.21 
Quadratic 7 0 1 55.59 1.32 0.69 113.73 1.44 0.49 
Familiarity (independence, 
exclusivity) 
Intercept 7 0 10 23.32 -0.01 0.23 39.65 -0.01 0.19 
Linear 7 0 1 87.19 0.1 0.3 82.92 -0.04 0.22 
Quadratic 7 0 1 49.03 0.1 0.61 67.99 0.11 0.48 
Familiarity  
(redundancy) 
Intercept 7 0 10 26.43 0.96 0.26 43.73 0.93 0.19 
Linear 7 0 1 111.07 0.19 0.28 84.5 -0.05 0.19 
Quadratic 7 0 1 76.77 0.96 0.58 116.98 1.01 0.43 
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 Table 7.2: List of object locations 
Object Locations 
# Name 










1 microwave 14 19 13 13 11 10 19 
2 kitchen roll 8 17 11 16 4 19 2 
3 saucepan 3 2 15 18 15 12 13 
4 toaster 12 4 20 1 8 1 9 
5 bowl of fruits 13 11 6 16 18 16 1 
6 tea pot 18 5 5 7 2 15 4 
7 knife 20 13 10 14 6 13 14 
8 mixer 9 18 12 3 14 14 17 
9 bread 4 15 19 11 16 4 16 
10 glass jug 15 7 8 4 7 8 6 
11 mug 17 3 3 19 20 3 11 
12 dishes 6 10 9 12 10 20 10 
13 towels 7 14 17 10 5 18 5 
14 toy 11 12 2 6 1 9 15 
15 books 2 1 4 8 19 7 7 
16 umbrella 1 8 18 17 12 5 8 
17 hat 16 6 1 2 17 11 20 
18 helmet 5 9 16 20 3 6 12 
19 calendar 10 20 14 5 13 17 3 
20 fan 19 16 7 9 9 2 18 
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7.1 Original analysis of remember/know data 
Remember/familiar judgements were initially analysed in line with pre-registered analysis of 
the mean expectancy rating for remember and familiar judgments, but further simulation 
showed that this trial-averaged analysis is biased by boundary effects on expectancy values 
(see https://jaquent.github.io/post/a-u-shape-that-appears-as-a-linear-correlation-when-
averaged/). The correlation between expectancy and the average number of remember response 
per object was, r = -0.41, t(18) = -1.9204, p = .070, while the correlation between expectancy 
and the average number of familiar response was, r = 0.40, t(18) = 1.8752, p = .08.  
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Figure 7.1: Accuracy results (non-propagated): Recall (left panels) and recognition (right 
panels) performance plotted across expectancy ratings for all four Experiments 1, 2, 3a 
and 3b (rows). The red line shows locally weighted smoothing (loess) of data to illustrate 
how well the fitted 2nd-order polynomial model using non-propagated evidence (white 
line) represents the data. The thin grey lines show 1,000 randomly selected fits from the 
posterior distributions, illustrating the uncertainty of the fit. Expectancy ratings 
originally ranged from -100 to +100, but were scaled to have SD = 0.5 in order to enable 
standard priors. 
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Figure 7.2: Recollection & familiarity results (non-propagated): 3AFC recognition 
performance based on recollection (under independent or redundant scoring, left panel) 
and familiarity (under independent or exclusive scoring, right panel) estimates across 
Experiment 2, Experiment 3a and Experiment 3b (rows). The red line shows locally 
weighted smoothing (loess) of data to illustrate how well the average model (the white 
line) represents the data. The thin grey lines show 1,000 randomly selected fits from the 
posterior distributions, to illustrate the uncertainty of the average model. Expectancy 
originally ranged from -100 to +100, but were scaled to have a SD = 0.5 in order to enable 
standard priors. 
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Table 7.3: Interrupted regression results for recall: A U-shape was found for breaking point 6  for recall as the CI and the BFs (order 






β1 2.5% 97.5% BF10 
BF10 
(OR) 
β2 2.5% 97.5% BF10 
BF10 
(OR) 
1 -0.73 -0.01 -2.36 2.29 0.99 0.98 0.07 -0.15 0.29 0.13 0.19 
2 -0.58 0.27 -1.63 2.3 0.93 0.74 0.26 -0.01 0.54 0.8 1.54 
3 -0.42 -0.01 -1.3 1.28 0.63 0.64 0.52 0.19 0.86 17.1 34.16 
4 -0.26 -0.85 -1.8 0.08 2.41 4.64 0.53 0.15 0.92 7.06 14.06 
5 -0.1 -0.61 -1.23 0.01 2.08 4.05 0.72 0.23 1.22 13.59 27.11 
6 0.06 -0.78 -1.3 -0.28 27.46 54.89 0.69 0.06 1.34 3.18 6.27 
7 0.22 -0.38 -0.78 0.01 1.16 2.25 1.35 0.46 2.27 35.93 71.75 
8 0.38 -0.35 -0.67 -0.03 1.71 3.37 1.78 0.36 3.27 16.2 32.2 
9 0.54 -0.31 -0.58 -0.04 1.67 3.3 1.15 -0.72 3.45 1.65 2.89 
10 0.69 -0.19 -0.41 0.03 0.44 0.84 0.02 -2.31 2.35 1.05 1.05 
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Table 7.4: Interrupted regression results for 3AFC: No U-shape was detected for 3AFC as the CI and the BFs (order restricted) 






β1 2.5% 97.5% BF10 
BF10 
(OR) 
β2 2.5% 97.5% BF10 
BF10 
(OR) 
1 -0.73 0.01 -2.31 2.3 1.05 1.04 0.27 0.03 0.51 1.42 2.81 
2 -0.58 -0.63 -2.92 1.34 1.05 1.52 0.4 0.12 0.68 5.88 11.73 
3 -0.42 -0.54 -1.91 0.8 0.86 1.34 0.55 0.21 0.89 29.23 58.41 
4 -0.26 -0.84 -1.77 0.12 2.06 3.93 0.5 0.1 0.92 4.28 8.48 
5 -0.1 -0.51 -1.16 0.14 1.08 2.02 0.55 0.03 1.08 2.38 4.66 
6 0.06 -0.31 -0.82 0.21 0.49 0.87 0.75 0.11 1.42 4.36 8.63 
7 0.22 -0.01 -0.42 0.41 0.2 0.21 1.64 0.69 2.61 116.52 232.88 
8 0.38 -0.13 -0.46 0.21 0.22 0.33 2.24 0.71 3.95 44.31 88.42 
9 0.53 -0.19 -0.47 0.09 0.31 0.56 1.1 -0.78 3.57 1.5 2.57 
10 0.69 -0.09 -0.33 0.14 0.16 0.24 0.06 -2.28 2.5 0.99 1.04 
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Table 7.5: Interrupted regression for recollection: A U-shape was found for breaking points 6 - 9 in recollection as the CI and the BFs  






β1 2.5% 97.5% BF10 
BF10 
(OR) 
β2 2.5% 97.5% BF10 BF10(OR) 
1 -0.73 0.01 -2.3 2.38 1 0.99 -0.35 -0.54 -0.15 20.37 0.01 
2 -0.57 0.01 -1.8 1.88 0.87 0.86 -0.15 -0.42 0.11 0.24 0.06 
3 -0.42 -0.09 -1.41 1.19 0.64 0.71 0.08 -0.23 0.39 0.17 0.24 
4 -0.26 -0.77 -1.7 0.17 1.75 3.33 0.13 -0.24 0.49 0.23 0.35 
5 -0.1 -0.72 -1.35 -0.11 4.25 8.4 0.48 0 0.95 1.67 3.26 
6 0.06 -0.85 -1.36 -0.35 46.02 91.97 0.84 0.21 1.48 12.25 24.42 
7 0.22 -0.84 -1.23 -0.45 309.78 619.55 1.22 0.37 2.1 20.27 40.45 
8 0.38 -0.82 -1.15 -0.5 4342.91 8685.82 1.67 0.33 3.15 12.91 25.63 
9 0.53 -0.72 -0.99 -0.45 3570.19 7140.37 1.98 -0.13 4.77 4.39 8.45 
10 0.69 -0.62 -0.84 -0.39 3407.16 6814.31 0.14 -2.22 2.6 0.97 1.07 
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Table 7.6: Interrupted regression results for familiarity: No U-shape was detected for familiarity scored following independence 






β1 2.5% 97.5% BF10 
BF10 
(OR) 
β2 2.5% 97.5% BF10 
BF10 
(OR) 
1 -0.73 0.01 -2.45 2.43 1 0.98 -0.18 -0.42 0.08 0.31 0.05 
2 -0.57 0.07 -2.04 2.09 0.92 0.86 -0.05 -0.39 0.28 0.17 0.13 
3 -0.42 0.21 -1.28 1.75 0.76 0.59 0.13 -0.26 0.5 0.23 0.34 
4 -0.26 -0.34 -1.45 0.74 0.61 0.9 0.24 -0.22 0.72 0.38 0.64 
5 -0.1 -0.76 -1.56 0.03 2.38 4.62 0.2 -0.36 0.79 0.35 0.53 
6 0.06 -0.56 -1.16 0.03 1.72 3.34 0.46 -0.27 1.21 0.76 1.35 
7 0.22 -0.45 -0.93 0.02 1.37 2.65 0.94 -0.06 1.98 2.86 5.53 
8 0.38 -0.61 -1.01 -0.22 16.76 33.48 0 -1.4 1.39 0.68 0.67 
9 0.53 -0.37 -0.69 -0.05 1.95 3.84 0.08 -1.77 2.04 0.89 0.94 
10 0.69 -0.27 -0.54 0.02 0.82 1.6 0.08 -2.3 2.52 1.04 1.09 
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